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Urgese: Dolphin Protection
DOLPHIN PROTECTION AND THE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT HAVE MET
THEIR MATCH: THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

I. INTRODUCTION
The conflict between international environmental conservation and international
free trade is not a battle between good and evil, but a struggle between reconciling
the good with the good.' Indeed, the international community has recognized the
growing "need for rules to enhance [the] positive interaction between trade and
environmental measures, for the promotion of sustainable development."'2 The
contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [hereinafter
GATT] agreed to formalize this principle during the Uruguay Round in April of
1994 by establishing a Committee on Trade and the Environment [hereinafter
CTE].3 This was an important step toward commingling international trade and

Bill Bryant, Global Trade Needn't Come at Expense of Environment, SEATrLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, June 27, 1997, at A15 (quoting William Clark who aptly notes that
"Humanity is entering an era of chronic, large-scale and extremely complex syndromes of
interdependence between the global economy and the world environment ....[A] major
challenge of the coming decades is to learn how long-term, large-scale interactions between
environment and development can be better managed to increase prospects for economically
sustained improvements in human well-being.") (internal quotations omitted).
2 Trade and Environment, GATrMinisterialDecisionofl4April 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1268 (1994); see also Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCC): Third Meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP), Kyoto,
Japan, Jan., 1997, reprintedin ALI-ABA Course of Study: Environmental Law, Feb. 11-14,
1998, Bethesda, Md., at 193 (instituting specific measures to reduce the aggregate effects
of greenhouse gases on global warming in concert with members of the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted 16 Sept. 1987; to date thirty-nine
countries have committed to quantified emission limitations and reductions.); Richard N.
Cooper, Toward a Real Global Warming Treaty, 77 FOR. AFF. 66 (Mar./Apr. 1998)
[hereinafter Cooper, Real Global Warning] (outlining the multilateral commitment of the
members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the
Montreal Protocol to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by 2010).
3 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, InternationalTrade and Protectionofthe Environment: The
Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 269 (1997) [hereinafter
Schoenbaum, Search for Reconciliation](quoting the Ministerial Decision adopted by the
GATT members at the final meeting of the Uruguay Rounds). The CTE under the[World
Trade Organization hereinafter WTO] in 1994 was charged with the following issues:
(1)the relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and
trade measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral
agreements;
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environmental policies as GATT had been seen as a strictly trade oriented,
multilateral agreement. 4

(2) the relationship between the environmental policies relevant to trade and
environmental measures with significant trade effects and the provisions of the
multilateral trading system;
(3) the relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and:
(a) charges and taxes for environmental purposes
(b) requirements for environmental purposes relating to products, including
standards and technical regulations, packaging, labeling and recycling;
(4) the provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency
of trade measures used for environmental purposes and environmental measures
and requirements which have significant trade effects;
(5) the relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the multilateral
trading system and those found in multilateral environmental agreements;
(6) the effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation
to developing countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and
environmental benefits of removing trade restrictions and distortions;
(7) the issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods;
(8) the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights;
(9) the work programme envisaged in the Decision on Trade in Services and the
Environment; and
(10) input to the relevant bodies in respect of appropriate arrangements for
relations with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.
Id. (quoting Ministerial Decision, 33 I.L.M. 1267, 1267-1269) (1994) (internal quotations
omitted). The creation of the WTO worried many environmentalists because of its
"functioning" institutional structure and its ambiguous goal set forth in the preamble:
"optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development." Jennifer Shultz, The GATT/WTO Committee on Trade and Environment-Toward Environmental Reform, 89 AM. J. INT'LL. 423,424-26 (1995) [hereinafter Shultz,
GATT/WTO Committee] (quoting Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
GATr Doc. MTN/FA, Preamble (Apr. 15, 1994), reprintedin 33 L.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994))
(noting also that the creation of the CTE was viewed by environmentalists as an important
change in GATT's approach toward uniting trade and environmental considerations).
' Schoenbaum, Searchfor Reconciliation, supranote 3, at 268 (noting that the GATT
Council established a Working Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade
in 1971 but that the group had not met for over twenty years); see also Andrea C. Durbin,
Trade and the Environment:The North-SouthDivide, ENV'T, Sept. 1, 1995 at 16 (addressing
GAI and the environment from an economic prospective and noting that although
environmentalists warned that trade rules "threatened global environmental protection...
environmental groups from industrialized and developing countries differ significantly on
the substantive issues and the process for resolving them."). Hence, while nations such as
the United States are economically stable enough to construe GATT as more than a liberal
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/5
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Partially due to the international community's historic lack of initiative with
respect to protecting the environment, 5 and also due to the increasing pressure from
its citizens to protect depleting sea mammal populations,6 the United States (U.S.)
Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA).7 The
MMPA is a unilateral legislative measure imposed by the U.S. to enforce its
environmental policy of reducing dolphin mortality by employing domestic fishing

trade mechanism, developing countries view GATT as the key to economic development.
Id. (noting that the United States is more concerned with GATT increasing 'the primacy of
the global trade rules over all other policy goals and domestic laws on the federal, state and
local levels,' as an issue of sovereignty, compared with developing countries who perhaps
view trade as more vital to their status in the international community)(quoting Ralph
Nader's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).
5 Paul J. Yechout, Note, In the Wake of Tuna II: New Possibilitiesfor GATT-Compliant
EnvironmentalStandards,5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 247 (1996) [hereinafter Yechout, In
the Wake of Tuna 11] ("From its inception, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATI) has focused on economic matters, often to the exclusion of environmental
concerns.").
6 Thomas E. Skilton, Note, GATT and the Environment in Conflict: The Tuna-Dolphin
Dispute and the Questfor an InternationalConservationStrategy, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
455, 455 [(1993) hereinafter Skilton, GATT and the Environment in Conflict] (noting that
the MMPA was "[e]nacted in response to the public outcry over the slaughter of several
species of marine mammals .... "). The initial outcry from environmentalists over the
incidental catch of dolphins by tuna fishing vessels occurred as early as the 1960s when the
number of "U.S. purse seiners increased significantly." United States International Trade
Commission (U.S.I.T.C.), Tuna: Competitive ConditionsAffecting the U.S. and European
Tuna Industries in Domestic and ForeignMarkets- Report to the Committee on Finance,
U.S. Senate, and the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives,
Investigation No. 332-291 Under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, USITC Pub. 2339
(Dec. 1990), availablein LEXIS, ITC File, 1990 ITC LEXIS 395, at 30 [hereinafter USITC,
1990] (noting that the MMPA "was enacted by Congress in 1972 in response to public
concern that certain marine mammal populations, including dolphins, were being harvested
in such numbers that they risked becoming endangered species.").
7 16 U.S.C. § 1361-1407 (1985) [hereinafter "MMPA"], as amendedby the International
Dolphin Conservation Program Act, 111 Stat. 1122 (1997) [hereinafter "IDCPA"]. The
MMPA was initially amended in 1981. See generally Caroline E. Coulston, Comment,
FlipperCaught in the Net of Commerce: Reauthorizationofthe MarineMammal Protection
Act and Its Effects on Dolphin, 11 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 97, 110-12
(1990) (addressing the 1981 amendments to the MMPA stemming from the lack of progress
achieved in the reduction of dolphin and other marine mammal mortality rates).
Amendments were later added to the MMPA in 1984 and again in 1988. Act of July 17,
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-364, Stat. 440; MMPA Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-74, 102
Stat. 4755.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998
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regulation and applying trade embargoes upon non-conforming foreign countries. 8
Initially, the statute was interpreted as an exercise of domestic environmental policy
addressing the devastating impact of certain commercial fishing techniques used in
U.S. territorial waters and on the high seas. 9 However, in 1991 the MMPA became
recognized as an international trade barrier after GATT's Dispute Resolution Panel
rendered a decision in favor of Mexico who had complained that the application of
the MMPA was inconsistent with the U.S.'s obligations under GATT. 1°

8

Skilton, GATT and the Environment in Conflict, supra note 6, at 455-56 (describing

the MMPA as containing "provisions which specifically seek to reduce the number of
dolphins killed by tuna fishing vessels on the high seas."). Section 1371 of the MMPA titled
"Moratorium on Taking and Importing Marine Mammals and Marine Mammal Products,"
specifically provides, inter alia, that "[t]he Secretary of the Treasury shall ban the
importation of commercial fish or products from fish which have been caught with
commercial fishing technology which results in the incidental kill or incidental serious injury
of ocean mammals in excess of United States standards." 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (Supp.
1997).
9 United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1003 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The [B]asic purpose
of... [the MMPA] ... appears to be the protection of marine mammals only within the
territory of the United States and on high seas. Conservation in other [sovereign] states is
left to diplomatic [relations]."); see also LouAnna C. Perkins, Comment, International
Dolphin Conservation Under U.S. Law: Does MightMake Right?, 1 OCEAN & COASTALL.J.
213, 214 (1995) [hereinafter Perkins, Does Might Make Right?] (describing the enactment
of the MMPA as an attempt "to balance the need for dolphin protection with the economic
interests of U.S. tuna fisherman.") Hence, there appeared to be little attention given to the
international ramifications of the MMPA until the 1980s. See generally James Joseph, The
Tuna-Dolphin Controversy in the Eastern Pacific Ocean: Biological, Economic, and
PoliticalImpacts, 25 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1 (1994) (outlining the history of domestic
concerns over dolphin mortality and the progress leading up to the implementation of a
multinational program involving ten nations stemming from the International Dolphin
Conservation Act of 1992).
1o See Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, reprintedin 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna/DolphinI, Panel
Report]. The prospect that the United States was in violation of its obligations as a signatory
to GATT was of particular importance in light of Justice Holmes' determination that a valid
treaty supersedes state authority as the supreme law of the land under Article VI of the
Constitution. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920), aff'g, U.S. v. Samples, 258
F. 479 (W.D. Mo. 1919) (noting also that the federal government can act by means of a
treaty in the "national interest of very nearly the first magnitude... [that] can be protected
only by national action in concert with... another power."). However, when a conflict
arises between a valid treaty and a congressionally enacted statute, whichever was enacted
later controls, under the rule that "the last expression of the sovereign will must control."
LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 226 (2d ed. 1988).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/5
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This Comment focuses on the Panel Reports issued in 1991 and 1994, commonly
referred to as Tuna/Dolphin I and H respectively, which addressed the MMPA's
conflicts with GATT. Part I briefly outlines the purpose of the MMPA and its
general regulatory scheme as it affects foreign fishing fleets. Part II examines the
Panel Reports and their conclusions. Part EI analyzes the reactions of both the
United States and the international community in the wake of the Panel Reports and
presents several approaches for avoiding future conflicts between trade and the
environment. The Comment concludes with a global outlook on the possibility of
harmonizing trade with environmental conservation in the near future.
II. THE MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT OF 1972
A. Purpose of the Act
The principle goal of the MMPA is to ensure the vitality of various species of
marine mammals nearing extinction or depletion due to human activity.11 The Act
expressly acknowledges the international significance of marine mammals. 2
Reaching beyond the territorial waters of the U.S., the Act seeks to prevent certain
species of marine mammals from falling "[below their] optimum sustainable

"' MMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1361(1), (2) (1985). Section 1361(1) provides that "certain
species and population stocks of marine mammals are, or may be, in danger of extinction or
depletion as a result of man's activities." 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1) (1972); see also, infra Part
III, notes 120, 122, and accompanying text (discussing the International Dolphin
Conservation Program Act (IDCPA), amending the MMPA). The IDCPA amends the
purposes of the MMPA to include the following:
(1) to give effect to the Declaration of Panama, signed October 4, 1995, by the
Governments of Belize, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Honduras,
Mexico, Panama, Spain, the United States of America, Vanuatu, and Venezuela,
including the establishment of the International Dolphin Conservation Program,
relating to the protection of dolphins and other species, and the conservation and
management of tuna in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean;
(2) to recognize that nations fishing for tuna in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean
have achieved significant reductions in dolphin mortality associated with that
fishery; and
(3) to eliminate the ban on imports of tuna from those nations that are in
compliance with the International Dolphin Conservation Program.
International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, Pub. L. No. 105-42, 11 Stat. 1122(1997)
(codified as amendment to the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1362-

1407) (1985).
16 U.S.C. § 1361(6) (1985) ("Marine mammals have proven themselves to be
resources of great international significance, aesthetic and recreational as well as economic
12
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population"' 3 on the high seas.' 4 The basic Congressional mandate required that the
MMPA "[be administered for the benefit of the protected species rather than for]
the benefit of commercial exploitation."15 Thus, disputes have arisen under U.S.
16 U.S.C. § 1362 (9) (1997) ("The term 'optimum sustainable population' means,
with respect to any population stock, the number of animals which will result in the
maximum productivity of the population or the species, keeping in mind the carrying
capacity of the habitat and the health of the ecosystem of which they form a constituent
element.").
14 Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449, 1450 (9th Cir. 1991), vacatedfor
lack of jurisdiction by Earth Island Institute v. Brown, 28 F. 3d 76 (9th Cir. 1993)
("Congress enacted specific standards intended to ensure that foreign tuna fishing fleets
would reduce the number of dolphins killed and to protect certain endangered subspecies of
dolphins."). The term "high seas" is defined under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea (Law of the Sea) to mean "all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea
or internal waters of a State." Convention on the High Seas, Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2312.
However, the United States refused to sign the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
(LOSC), which took the place of the 1962 Convention. U.N. Document A/CONF.62/122
of Oct. 7, 1982 [hereinafter, LOSC]; ee also Raul Pedrozo, The InternationalDolphin
ConservationAct of 1992: UnreasonableExtension of U.S. Jurisdictionin the Eastern
Tropical Pacific Ocean Fishery, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 86 (1993)[hereinafter Pedrozo,
UnreasonableExtension](describing the U.S.'s refusal to sign as "[eliminating] further hope
of reaching international consensus on the issue of fishery management..."). In 1983,
President Ronald Reagan established an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) "in which the
United States [would] exercise sovereign rights in living and nonliving resources within 200
nautical miles of its coast." 1 Pub. Papers 383 (Mar. 10, 1983) (stating the U.S.'s interest
in exercising its jurisdiction over mineral resources). This was explicit recognition that the
non-seabed portions of the LOS reflected customary international law and gave the U.S. the
authority to "take limited additional steps to protect the marine environment" in the EEZ.
Id. The scope of the EEZ set forth in the LOS is stated as follows: "The exclusive economic
zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea is measured." LOSC, supra, at art. 57. The limits on the territorial sea
is set at "12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance" with
Articles 4-16 of the Convention. Id. at art. 3...
13

According to the United States International Trade Commission, the U.S. does not
impose unilateral jurisdiction over tuna within its 200-mile fishery conservation zone and
the U.S. does not recognize such jurisdiction by other nations. See USITC, 1990, supra note
6, at 33-34 (stating that the basis for this policy rests in the fact that "tuna are highly
migratory, and it is therefore the U.S. position that no one nation has the ability to effectively
manage tuna resources."). Instead, the U.S. has preferred to manage migratory areas
adjacent to U.S. territorial waters through multilateral cooperation. Id. at 34.
'5 Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297, n.24 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), aff'd, 540 F.2d 1141 (1976) ("Congress enacted the MMPA for one basic
purpose: to provide marine mammals, especially porpoise, with necessary and extensive
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/5
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domestic law and under GATT regarding how far the Act may go in achieving this
environmental policy. 6
B. YellowFin Tuna and Purse Seine Fishing Techniques
The Panel Decisions in Tuna/Dolphin I and Tuna/Dolphin H involved the
application of the MMPA against foreign commercial fisherman operating in the
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP)"7 , who used purse seine fishing techniques
to capture yellowfin tuna.'8 For some unexplained reason, yellowfin tuna swim

protection against man's activities."). The court in addressing whether the National Marine
Fisheries Service failed to meet specific requirements in issuing permits providing for the
incidental taking of marine mammals rejected the notion that the MMPA required only that
"amount of protection which is consistent with the maintenance [of] a healthy tuna
industry." Id. at 309. Hence, the protection afforded to marine mammals under the MMPA
does not include a balancing between the interests of the fishing industry and the marine
mammals themselves. Id.
16 In a line of cases asserted against the sitting Secretary of Commerce, the Earth Island
Institute sought to enforce a primary embargo of tuna products against Mexico under the
MMPA. See Mosbacher,929 F.2d at 1449 (referred to as "Earth Island I") (requiring an
embargo of Mexican imports of tuna products); Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 785
F.Supp. 826 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (referred to as "Earth Island IT') (ordering the Secretary of
Commerce to institute measures to enforce the primary and secondary embargoes required
under the MMPA against Mexico), vacatedfor lack ofjurisdictionby Earth Island Institute
v. Brown, 28 F.3d 76 (9th Cir. 1993) (referred to as "Earth Island III") (holding that 28
U.S.C. §1581 (1988) provides exclusive jurisdiction of embargo issues to the United States
Court of International Trade) (citing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176 (1988).
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Earth Island I led Mexico to file a protest to the embargoes
under GA'T. See Perkins, Does Might Make Right, supra note 9, at 232 ("Shortly after
Earth Island I was decided, Mexico registered a protest that embargoes imposed pursuant
to the MMPA by the United States violated provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT.").
'7 The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) currently defines the eastern tropical
Pacific Ocean as "bounded by 40 <<degrees>> N. latitude, 40 <<degrees>> S. latitude, 160
<<degrees>> W. longitude and the coastlines of North, Central and South America." 50
C.F.R. § 216.3 (1997). This area encompasses all of the Pacific Ocean, east of Hawaii and
between Canada and Mexico extended.
1" See Stanley M. Spracker and David C. Lundsgaard, Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed
Attention on the Future of Free Trade and Protection of the Environment, 18 COLuM. J.
ENVTL. L. 385, 388 (1993) [hereinafter Spracker and Lundsgaard, Dolphins and Tuna]
(explaining the use of purse seine nets and the various devises used to trap tuna and
consequently dolphins as well). "The nets used by tuna harvesters, called 'purse seine'
because their operation resembles the closing of a purse, are then pulled up from beneath the
tuna and the dolphins [using] a system of weights and floats." Id.; see also Tuna/Dolphin
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998
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underneath schools of dolphins in the ETP. 9 With the advent of extensive use of
purse seine fishing in the 1950's, millions of dolphins were netted along with tuna
and needlessly killed. 0 Recognizing this problem, Congress provided specific

I, Panel Report, reprintedin, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991); Tuna/Dolphin H, Dispute Settlement
Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, July, 1994, reprintedin, 33 I.L.M.
839 (1994) [hereinafter TunalDolphin II, PanelReport]. Both panel reports began their
analysis by describing the prevalence of purse seine fishing techniques and acknowledging
their adverse impact on marine mammal life. Tuna/DolphinI, PanelReport, 30 I.L.M. at
1598 ("The last three decades have seen the deployment of tuna fishing technology based
on the "purse-seine" net in many areas of the world."); Tuna/Dolphin H, Panel Report, 33
I.L.M. at 845-846 ("Since the 1960's, the practice of intentionally setting purse seine nets
on dolphins to catch tuna has resulted in the incidental killing and injury of many
dolphins.").
19 Mosbacher, 929 F.2d at 1449; See also Dept. of Comm., National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Supplementary Information on the Taking and
Importing of MarineMammals, 56 Fed. Reg. 4981 (1991) (making a similar finding that
"For unknown reasons, yellowfin tuna tend to congregate beneath schools of dolphin in the
eastern tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP). Large purse seine nets are set around the dolphins,
capturing the tuna and dolphin together."); cf. USITC, 1990, supra note 6, at 36-37
(describing the cost of purse seine fishing vessels, how they are equipped, and the type of
vessels a majority of U.S. fisherman use to harvest tuna). Some fishing vessels are known
as "superseiners" because they can carry up to 2,000 tons of tuna harvest (measured in round
fish weight), spread almost 200 feet in length and 75 feet in width, and cost nearly $15
million U.S. to construct. Id. These vessels usually have a crew of around 18 and are
equipped with highly advanced satellite navigation and sonar systems, automatic monitoring
systems, and helicopters. Id. Although the bulk of U.S. tropical tuna is caught using these
vessels, the majority of U.S. albacore is caught using "trollers" which are significantly
smaller and easily adaptable to other fisheries such as salmon and crab. Id. at 37. Prior to
1960, the majority of U.S. tuna was harvested using "bailboats," which are specially
equipped to keep the tuna catches frozen. Id.
20 Earth Island Institute v. Brown, 865 F. Supp. 1364,1366 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("Between
1959, when purse seine nets became widely used and 1972, millions of dolphins were killed
by tuna fisherman in the ETP."). The federal court for the Northern District of California
held that permits issued to commercial fisherman under the MMPA prohibited holders of
such permits from continuing to kill northeastern offshore spotted dolphins in the ETP when
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) had listed such species as depleted. Id. at
1369. This finding was consistent with Section 1371 (a)(3)(B) of the MMPA which states,
inter alia,that:
(B) Except for scientific research purposes ... during the moratorium, no permit
may be issued for the taking of any marine mammal which has been designated by
the Secretary [of Commerce] as depleted, and no importation may be made of any
such animal.
16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a) (3) (B) (Supp. 1997).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/5
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provisions under the MMPA to severely restrict the use of purse seine fishing
techniques in the ETP.21
Section 1371 of the MMPA mandates that the Secretary of the Treasury "ban
[the] imports of yellowfin tuna products from a foreign nation until the Secretary
of Commerce certifies that that nation's incidental kill rate of dolphins is
comparable to that of the United States. 22 The comparable incidental kill rate is
based on a restrictive sliding scale which initially requires that a foreign nation's
kill rate not be more than two times that of the United States.23 An "incidental
catch" is defined by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NFS) as one in which
a marine mammal is captured "because it is directly interfering with commercial
operations, or... as a consequence of the steps used to secure the fish in connection
with commercial fishing operations. '24 However, the catch is only incidental if the

Brown, 865 F. Supp. at 1367 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(1997), which provides
that it is Congress' goal to reduce the incidental kill rates by commercial fishing to
"insignificant levels approaching zero" and in the case of purse seine fishing for yellowfin
tuna, the techniques should embody "the application of the best marine mammal safety
techniques and equipment that are economically and technologically practicable.") (internal
quotations omitted); see also American Tunaboat Ass'n v. Baldridge, 738 F.2d 1013, 1014
(9th Cir. 1984) (noting that it was the high mortality rate of dolphins resulting from the use
of purse seine nets that led to the enactment of the MMPA).
22 Mosbacher,929 F.2d at 1450 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1997)). As amended,
this section provides that "[t]he Secretary of the Treasury shall ban the importation of
commercial fish or products from fish which have been caught with commercial fishing
technology which results in the incidental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean mammals
in excess of United States standards." 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a)(2) (Supp. 1997). The following
analysis of the MMPA addresses the relevant provisions prior to the 1997 amendments by
the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA). See infra Part HI, note 120
and accompanying text (discussing IDCPA Amendments as a result of Tuna/Dolphin I and
I).
23 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (1997) (which provides that "the average rate of
incidental taking by vessels of the harvesting nation is no more than 2.0 times that of [the]
United States vessels during the same period by the end of the 1989 fishing season and no
more than 1.25 times that of [the] United States vessels during the same period by the end
of the 1990 fishing season and thereafter.").
24 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1997). The Department of Commerce through its statutory
authority under sections 1373 and 1382 created the National Marine Fisheries Service (NFS)
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to promulgate
appropriate regulations pursuant to the MMPA. The former defines such terms as an
"incidental catch," while the latter is charged with determining which species of porpoise
are 'disadvantaged or 'depleted' within the meaning of the MMPA. See infra note 25,
(discussing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Authorization Act of 1992 (describing
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998
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fishing vessel does not intentionally use the sight of the dolphins as a proxy for
catching tuna and the fishing vessel immediately releases any uninjured dolphins
entangled in the purse seine nets. 25
Foreign fishing vessels exceeding the incidental killing quota or failing to
provide data by July 31 of each year 26 (evidencing compliance), are subjected to an

the duties of the NOAA). The differences between the two agencies might be more easily
characterized as interpretive versus scientific with regard to their definitional and regulatory
roles.
25 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1997) (adding that an incidental catch will be so characterized only
if the marine mammal taken is immediately "returned to the sea with a minimum of injury
and further, that the taking of a marine mammal, which otherwise meets the requirements
...shall not be considered an incidental catch of the mammal if it is used subsequently to
assist in commercial fishing operations."). In 1992, Congress considered a bill entitled "An
Act to authorize appropriations for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
for fiscal year 1992. 138 CONG. REC. S17411-02 (1992); 138 CONG. REc. Hl 1795-01
(1992) (addressing amendments to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Act, Pub. L. 98-210, 97 Stat. 1409, 16 U.S.C. § 1384 (1981))[hereinafter, NOAA Act].
Both the House of Representatives and the Senate agreed to increase the NOAA's budget
for the "Development of Dolphin-Safe Methods of Tuna Fishing," and amended the NOAA
Act to clarify what the duties of the NOAA were in allocating these funds:
Section 2 (as amended)
(d) ... [W]ithin six months after the date of enactment of this subsection, the
Secretary, in cooperation with the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission and
after consultation with interested persons, shall publish a program for public
comment that shall provide for(1) cooperative research to improve understanding of the behavioral association
of dolphins and yellowfin tuna in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean;
(2) development, testing, and implementation of new methods of locating and
catching yellowfin tuna without the incidental taking of dolphins; and
(3) appropriate measures to ensure program participation and sharing of
associated costs by each foreign government that conducts, or authorizes its
nationals to conduct, yellowfm tuna fishing in the eastern tropical Pacific
Ocean.
Id. at S17415; Hl1799.
26 Mosbacher, 929 F.2d at 1450-51. The rule quoted by the Ninth Circuit has been
revised as a result of the court's holding. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e)(5)(iv) (1997). The
regulation now provides that a foreign nation may request a review of whether the nation is
maintaining compliance with the quota requirements by submitting data of fishing trips
between October 1 and September 30 of a given year by December 1. Id.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/5
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embargo against the importation of their fish products.27 Section 1371 allows the
issuance of permits for the incidental taking of marine mammals during commercial
fishing operations.28 However, the permit may only be issued by the NMFS if the
particular mammal is not considered depleted by more than 60% of its historic
population levels.2 9 In view of Congress' determination that various species of

27

50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e)(5)(I) (1997) (embargoes are issued by the Secretary of the

Treasury upon notification by the NFS); see also Yechout, In the Wake of Tuna II, supra
note 5, at 252-53 (noting that the Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act of
1967, gave the President the authority to "ban all fish products from any country whose
policies diminish the effectiveness of any international fisheries conservation program")
(citing 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1994).
28 16 U.S.C. §1371(a)(1), (2) (Supp. 1997) (providing the specific authority for issuing
permits pursuant to § 1371 of the MMPA). Section 1374 specifically authorizes the
Secretary of Commerce to issue permits in some of the following conditions:
(5)(A) Upon request therefor by citizens of the United States who engage in a
specific activity (other than commercial fishing) within a specified geographical
region, the Secretary shall allow, during periods of not more than five consecutive
years each, the incidental, but not intentional, taking by citizens... after notice (in
the Federal Register and in newspapers of general circulation, and through
appropriate electronic media [if the Secretary] ....
(i) finds that the total of such taking during each five-year (or less) period
concerned will have a negligible impact on such species or stock and will not have
an unmitigable adverse impact on the availability of such species or stock ....
16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(A)(i) (Supp. 1997). Subsection (h) of § 1374 was amended in
August of 1997 by the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act and now provides:
(h) GENERAL PERMITS....
(1) Consistent with the regulations prescribed pursuant to section 103 of this title
and to the requirements of section 101 of this tile, the Secretary may issue an
annual permit to a United States purse seine fishing vessel for the taking of such
marine mammals, and shall issue regulations to cover the use of any such annual
permits.
16 U.S.C. § 1374(h)(1) (as amended)(1997).
29 58 Fed. Reg. 58285 (1993). The following table illustrates the 1991 incidental kill
rate data collected by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IA'ITC), the
organization charged with monitoring the incidental mortality rates in the ETP.
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dolphins have suffered extensively under purse seine fishing techniques, foreign
fishing vessels who account for the largest use of such techniques have felt the
brunt of the MMPA and have not received permits easily.3 °
The MMPA has been applied differently between U.S. and foreign fishing fleets.
For example, the permit exception under section 1371 is available to both foreign
and U.S. fleets but in 1984, Congress statutorily issued a permit to the American
Tunaboat Association (ATA) to avoid the complexities of the permit process for
U.S. fleets.3 ' Another example had to do with the issuance of permits regarding
certain specific species of protected mammals.3 2 U.S. citizens engaging in
commercial fishing operations could obtain a permit for "incidental, but not
intentional, takings having a negligible impact" on certain protected mammals under
the Act.33 However, foreign commercial fisherman were not entitled to this same
leeway.3 4 These types of discriminatory affects eventually led Mexico and members
of the European Union to call into question the validity of the MMPA under GATT.

Earth Island Institute v. Brown, 865 F. Supp. 1364, 1368 n. 4 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (noting
that a finding of depletion by the NMFS, though technically applying only to issuance of
domestic permits, is particularly significant to foreign fishing vessels due to the
comparability requirements noted above) "[T]he Secretary agrees that any such [(finding)]
would also affect foreign fleets, which in recent years have become the larger source of
dolphin mortality in the ETP." Id. Indeed, by 1991 the number of foreign purse seine
fishing vessels in the ETP increased nearly seven-fold (from thirteen to ninety) since the
MMPA was enacted in 1971. 57 Fed. Reg. 27010, 27013 Tbl. 1 (1992).
31 Brown, 865 F. Supp. at 1368 (In 1984, "Congress bypassed the process for
administratively renewing the ATA permit and instead statutorily extended the permit that
had been issued to the ATA by the Secretary in 1980."). The permit was codified by 16
U.S.C. § 1374(b)(2) (1985). The ATA is a large organization made up of members who
"fish commercially for yellowfin tuna in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean." American
Tunaboat Ass'n v. Baldridge, 738 F.2d 1013, 1014 (9th Cir. 1984).
32 Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795 (D.C.
Cir.
1988). Japanese commercial fisherman were issued a permit for commercial fishing of
salmon because the NMFS determined that their actions had a negligible impact on fur seals
protected under the Act. Id. The D.C. Circuit rejected the NMFS's determination on
numerous scientific and statutory grounds. Id.
3316 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(4), amendedandreplacedby 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(5) (1997). See
supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing § 1374 and the issuance of general permits
and permits issued pursuant to § 1371).
34 Kokechik, 839 F.2d at 802 ("The Secretary is not authorized to extend this flexibility
to the Japanese... If it is appropriate to grant foreign commercial fisherman some leeway
to take marine mammals incidentally in carrying out their commercial fishing operations for
salmon, it is for Congress, not the Secretary to decide.").
30
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IMl. TUNA/DOLPHIN I & I: ANALYSIS OF GATr DISPUTE PANEL DECISIONS
A. Tuna/DolphinI, 1991
In January of 1991, pursuant to Article XXII:2 of GATT, Mexico requested the
Contracting Parties to establish a dispute panel for reconciling the tuna import
restrictions imposed by the U.S. under the MMPA with the U.S.' s trade obligations
under GATT.3 5 After consultations between the U.S. and Mexico failed to resolve
the matter, the Council of GAT granted Mexico's request for a dispute panel in
February of 1991.36 Three issues made up the gravamen of Mexico's complaint.
First, the MMPA required Mexican fishermen to employ certain fishing
technology in the ETP, other than purse seine techniques, that limited the incidental
killing or incidental serious injury of marine mammals to levels comparable to U.S.
standards. 37 Next, the Act required that any vessel registered in Mexico and fishing
for yellowfin tuna must provide yearly data evidencing that their incidental taking
of marine mammals was comparable to the U.S. or face an embargo on the
importation of fish products.38 Finally, Mexico protested the application of the

3' Tuna/Dolphin I, PanelReport, 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1598. Article XXH: 2 of GATT
provides:
The CONTRACTING PARTIES, may, at the request of a contracting party,
consult with any contracting party in respect of any matter for which it has not been
possible to find a satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. xl 1:2 [hereinafter GA'IT]. 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
36 Tuna/Dolphin I, Panel Report, 30 I.L.M., at 1598. Mexico requested consultations
with the United States on the matter on November 5, 1990. Id. Consultations were held
between the parties on December 19, 1990. Mexico's request in January for the
establishment of the Panel was granted on February 6, 1991. Id. (noting that the following
nations reserved their rights and requested to be heard by the Panel: Australia, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the European Communities, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, Tanzania,
Thailand, Tunisia, and Venezuela).
31

JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC

RELATIONS § 12.3, 575-84 (3d ed. 1995) (outlining the issues confronting the Panel).
38 Tuna/Dolphin I, PanelReport, 30 I.L.M., at 1600-01 (describing the embargo issued
by the United States Customs Service against Mexico for the "importation of yellowfin tuna,
and 'light-meat' tuna products which can contain yellowfin tuna, under specified
Harmonized... tariff headings ... unless the importer provides a declaration that, based on
appropriate inquiry and the written evidence in his possession, no yellowfin tuna or tuna
products in the shipment were harvested with purse-seines in the ETP by vessels from
Mexico, Venezuela or Vanuatu."). Under the "Pelly Amendment" to the Fisherman's
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998
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"intermediary nations" 39 embargo provisions of the MMPA. The intermediary
embargo prohibits imports of tuna products from nations who fail to certify that
they have not imported tuna caught through use of purse seine methods from nations
4
0
subject to the "primary nations" embargo or the direct ban provided under the Act.
Mexico asserted that the import bans imposed by the U.S. constituted an
extraterritorial and unilateral attempt by the U.S. to impose domestic environmental
policy in a manner inconsistent with GATT.4 1

Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a), the Secretary of Commerce must certify the
embargo to the President, who may then prohibit the importation of tuna "for such duration
as the President determines appropriate and to the extent that such prohibition is sanctioned
by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Id. (quoting section 8(a) of the
Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967).
'9 Intermediate nations are those who violate the MMPA indirectly, not by failing to
satisfy the comparability standards of the U.S. themselves, but by importing tuna or tuna
products from nations who do, thereby making it possible that those products would wash
up on U.S. shores after processing. See, Spracker and Lundsgaard, Dolphins and Tuna,
supra note 18, at 401 (noting that the term intermediary nations ban meant "blocking tuna
imports from nations that imported tuna from nations subject to [a] direct ban."). This
definition of "intermediary embargo was eventually codified in the 1988 Amendments to the
MMPA and defined in Section 1362(5):
[T]he term 'intermediary nation' means a nation that exports yellowfin tuna or
yellowfim tuna products to the United States and that imports yellowfin tuna or
yellowfin tuna products that are subject to a direct ban on importation into the
United States pursuant to section 1371(a)(2)(B) of this title.
16 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (Supp. 1997). The countries labeled intermediary nations at the time
of Mexico's complaint were Costa Rica, France, Italy, Japan, and Panama. Tuna/Dolphin
I, Panel Report, 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1600 (1991).
4 Tuna/DolphinI, PanelReport,30 I.L.M. at 1600. Section 1371 (a)(2)(C) provides that
the Secretary of Commerce "shall require the [G]ovemment of any intermediary nation from
which yellowfin tuna or tuna products will be exported to the United States to certify and
provide reasonable proof that it has acted to prohibit the importation of such tuna and tuna
products from any nation from which direct export to the United States of such tuna and tuna
products is banned under this section within sixty days following the effective date of such
importation to the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a)(2)(C) (1991 amended by Supp.
1997). After six months from the time at which the intermediary nation has failed to submit
such certification, the Secretary was required to notify the President (Secretary of the
Treasury), who would apply an embargo pursuant to the Pelly Amendment. Id. Section
1371(a)(2)(C) has since been modified, but contains essentially the same requirements. 16
U.S.C. § 1372(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 1997).
41 Tuna/DolphinI, PanelReport,30 I.L.M. at 1605 (discussing Mexico's argument that
"[t]o accept that one contracting party might impose trade restrictions to conserve the
resources of another contracting party would have the consequence of introducing the
concept of extraterritoriality into the GATT, which would be extremely dangerous for all
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/5
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1. GATT Issues Raised
Mexico alleged that the relevant provisions of the MMPA amounted to a
"quantitative restriction" on their tuna products, prohibited by Article XI of
GATT.42 The U.S. countered that the embargo against Mexico was a permissible
"internal regulation" and met the national treatment requirement under Article III
of GATT. 43 Article m (4) and Ad Article 111permit contracting parties to place
regulations or internal taxes that are "collected or enforced in the case of the
imported product at the time or point of importation," provided that such
restrictions accord the importing country "treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to like products" of domestic origin."

contracting parties."). Mexico further argued that "under the MMPA, the United States not
only arrogated to itself [the] right of interference, but also the right of interference in trade
between other contracting parties, by providing for an embargo of countries considered to
be 'intermediary nations' simply because they continued to buy products which the United
States had unilaterally decided should not be imported by itself or by any other country."
Id.
42 Tuna/Dolphin I, Panel Report, 30 I.L.M. at 1602 (1991) (discussing Mexico's
argument that the exceptions to Article XI's proscription against quantitative restrictions on
imports and exports of products). Article XI(l) of GATT provides:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall
be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale
for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT, art. xl(I).
' The U.S. did not argue that provisions of the MMPA fell within the exceptions to the
general rule set forth in Article XI and listed in paragraph 2, but stated rather that the
MMPA provisions were "laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of yellowfin tuna harvested in
the ETP with purse-seine nets, and fully consistent with Article I" of GAIT.
Tuna/Dolphin I, PanelReport, 30 IL.M. at 1602.
GAi'T, art. II para. 4, ad art. III (as amended and in force, 1994). Ad Article Il
specifically provides, in relevant part:
Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or requirement
...
affecting the internal sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of
products.. .], which applies to an imported product and the like domestic product
and is collected or enforced in the case of the importedproductat the time orpoint
of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other internal
charge... (emphasis provided).
Id. This article sets forth what is referred to as the "National Treatment" principle: "The
products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be accorded treatmentno less favourable than that accordedto like
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998
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The U.S. argued that the restrictions on Mexican tuna products were merely an
enforcement at the time or point of importation of tuna products under the MMPA
(an internal regulation). 4' The U.S. asserted that these restrictions were applied
equally to both domestic and foreign products, thus satisfying the national treatment
requirement of Article III (4). On the other hand, Article XI prohibits any
contracting party from placing restrictions or prohibitions "on the importation of
any products of the territory of any other contracting party." 46 Thus, Mexico argued
that Article XI must be read separately from Article Em and that the U.S. could not
shirk its obligations under the former by asserting the latter.47
Relying on the interpretations of two previous panel reports 4' and on its own
reading of Article M, the Panel concluded that contracting parties could impose
"laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale of products," but
such parties could not attempt to impose similar restrictions on the processes used
to obtain or to create the products.4 9 Tuna taken by purse seine fishing methods are
the same as tuna harvested by whatever techniques used by U.S. commercial fishing
fleets to meet the MMPA's standards. 50 Since Article HI applies only to tuna

products of national origin... " Id. at art. I1 (4) (emphasis added).

' Tuna/Dolphin I,PanelReport, 30 I.L.M. at 1602 (describing the U.S.'s reliance on
a prior Panel Report on Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act,
GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 140, which stated that measures subject to the provisions
Article III were not to be considered in the context of Article XI or XIII).
46 GATT, art. XI. For text of GATT, art. XI, see supra note 42.
"7Spracker and Lundsgaard, Dolphinsand Tuna, supranote 18, at 395. ("Mexico, not

surprisingly, took the position that simply meeting the qualifications of Article III did not
justify the import ban, since Article III and Article XI were not exclusive. Even if the import
ban met the requirements of Article I, it could still be struck down as inconsistent with
Article XI.").
4'Panel Report on United States Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances,
June 17, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136 (1988); Panel Report on United States
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345
(1990).
'9 Tuna/Dolphin I, Panel Report, 30 I.L.M., at 1618 (noting that "under the national
treatment principle of Article I, contracting parties may apply border tax adjustments with
regard to those taxes that are borne by products, but not for domestic taxes not directly
levied on products (such as corporate income taxes)."). Hence, the import prohibition on
tuna under the MMPA did not constitute an internal tax covered by Note Ad Article I. Id.
'oSpracker and Lundsgaard, Dolphins and Tuna, supra note 18, at 396-97 (noting that
in the "Panel's view, tuna harvested by purse seine was identical, as a product, to tuna
harvested by any other method" of fishing). The Panel's interpretation of Article III, para.
4 rested on their previous panel holdings, which required "effective equality of opportunities
for imported products in respect of the application of laws, regulations or requirements
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products, and not to processes, the Panel concluded that the U.S. could not assert
Ad Article III's internal regulation allowance as justification for the embargo
against Mexico. 5'
The Panel noted that even had MMPA's tuna harvesting regulations been
construed as a regulation on the sale of tuna as a product, the U.S. had not complied
with Article Im1 (4)'s national treatment mandate in a number of areas. 2 Most
importantly, the MMPA's requirement that foreign vessels achieve incidental
takings of dolphins comparable to domestic standards, does not affect tuna as a
product.53 Therefore, the U.S. was "oblige[d] ...to [accord] treatment to Mexican

tuna no less favorable" than U.S. tuna regardless of whether "the incidental taking
of dolphins by Mexican vessels" corresponded to U.S. domestic standards.5 4
Having found Article III inapplicable, the Panel determined that the MMPA was
also inconsistent with Article Xl's prohibition against quantitative restrictions on

affecting the sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products,
and that this standard had to be understood as applicable to each individual case of imported
product." Tuna/Dolphin I,PanelReport, 30 I.L.M., at 1617 (citing previous panel reports,
supra note 48).
51 Tuna/DolphinI, Panel Report, 30 I.L.M. at 1618 (1991). The Panel found that the
U.S. embargo against Mexico "did not constitute internal regulations covered by the Note
Ad Article III." Id. at 1618-19 (adding that the MMPA's provisions which set a yearly
ceiling on the number of dolphins taken by domestic fishermen, but which also placed a

retroactive and variable ceiling on actual dolphin taken by the foreign tuna producers set
according to the number of dolphins taken by the domestic tuna fleet in the same time period
raised some concern but was inapposite in light of their conclusions regarding Article III).
52 Id. The Panel noted that the methods by which the NMFS determined compliance
with the comparability requirements (highlighted in Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929
F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991) and discussed supra note 19) discriminated against foreign
vessels. Id. at 1618. ("certain aspects of the requirements could give rise to legitimate
concern, in particular the MMPA provisions which set a prospective absolute yearly ceiling

for the number of dolphins taken by domestic tuna producers in the ETP, but required that
foreign tuna producers meet a retroactive and varying ceiling for each period based on actual
dolphin taking by the domestic tuna fleet in the same time period.").
" See Spracker and Lundsgaard, Dolphins and Tuna, supra note 18, at 395 (noting that
the Panel's primary concern was that Article 11 "only permits an importing country to
regulate a product qua product" and does not allow the regulation of the process why the
product is made).
" Tuna/DolphinI, PanelReport, 30 I.L.M. at 1618 (pointing out that if the MMPA was
actually regulating tuna products as such, the tuna embargoes were still violative of Article
[H1 because importing countries were not accorded national treatment when compared to
domestic tuna products under Article Ill para. 4).
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imports.55 The Panel concluded that the primary and intermediary embargoes
placed on imports of tuna products from Mexico was a quantitative restriction in
violation of Article XI of GATT.56
The final protest asserted by Mexico pertained to § 1371 (a)(2)(D) of the MMPA.
That section provides that once a ban on the importation of yellowfin tuna or tuna
products is issued it "shall be deemed . ..a certification" to extend import
prohibitions for all Mexican fish products under Section 8 of the Pelly Amendment
to the Fisherman's Protective Act. 57 The Pelly Amendment permits the President,
at his discretion, to "direct the Secretary of the Treasury to ban the importation of
all fish or wildlife products," from the country certified under § 137 1.5
Mexico argued that the statutory provision was inconsistent with Article XI of
GATT. 59 However, the Panel concluded that "legislation merely giving those
executive authorities the power to act inconsistently with the General Agreement
is not, in itself, inconsistent with the General Agreement." 6 Since the U.S. had not
yet imposed such a plenary ban, and since the Act did not require that the President
take such action, the Panel determined that the Pelly Amendment provision was not
inconsistent with GATT.6 1
2. GATF's General Exceptions
The United States attempted to justify the import ban on Mexico by asserting

51 Id. ("The United States did not present to the Panel any arguments to support a

different legal conclusion regarding Article XI.").
56

Id.

16 U.S.C. §1371(a)(2)(D) (referring to the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's
Protection Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. §1978(a) (1988)). See supranote 38 and accompanying
text (discussing the Pelly Amendment and the authority for imposing an embargo on
Mexico's tuna products).
58 Spracker and Lundsgaard, Dolphinsand-Tuna,supranote 18,_aL39_-1402_(discussing
the Pelly Amendment and the Panel's analysis).
'9TunalDolphinI, PanelRepof,-30-I.L.M. at 1619.
0 Id. (relying on two previous panel decisions to analyze the discretionary authority
afforded to the President in deciding whether to implement the embargoes permitted by the
Pelly Amendment) (citing panel reports on: (1) United States- Taxes on Petroleum and
Certain Imported Substances, June 17, 1987, GATI B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136, 160-64,
paras. 5.2.2,5.2.9-10 (1988); EEC- Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, GATT
B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 132, 198-99, paras. 5.25-5.26 (1991)).
61 Id.; see also Skilton, GATland the Environment in Conflict, supranote 6, at 470 ("as
the Pelly Amendment does not require trade measures to be taken, it is not inconsistent with
GATT.").
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/5
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two exceptions provided under Article XX of GATT. 62 First, the U.S. argued that
the prohibition on imports of tuna or tuna products were justified under Article
XX(b) as a necessary measure, solely for the purpose of protecting dolphin life and
health.63 Second, the provisions of the MMPA were justified under Article XX(g)

62

Article XX provides, in relevant part, that:

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life, or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption ....
GATT, art. XX.
63 Tuna/Dolphin I, PanelReport, 30 I.L.M. at 1619-20. Mexico's primary argument
against the application of Article XX(b) outside thejurisdiction of the United States was that
such measures were not necessary "because alternative means consistent with the General
Agreement were available to it to protect dolphin lives or health, namely international cooperation between the countries concerned." Id. at 1619. The U.S.'s concern was based
on the fact over 20 percent of the world's fisheries catch occurred in Latin America as of
1986. USITC, 1990, supra note 6, at 272 (noting also that Mexican tuna harvests reached
record levels by 1988 and that the tuna industry in Latin America had shown a significant
surge by the end of the 1980s).
The following table represents data taken by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission (IA'TC) illustrating that Mexico, Venezuela, and Ecuador were the leading
Latin American tuna fishing nations at the time of the Panel dispute:
LATIN AMERICAN TUNA FISHING NATIONS (in short tons)
COUNTRY

1980

1985

1986

1987

1988

Mexico

36,043

96,805

125,047

117,256

136,212

Venezuela

2,369

32,972

46,185

51,070

57,046

Ecuador

20,504

38,705

46,708

41,149

45,441

Panama

11,255

not significant

not significant

not significant

not significant

Peru

944

not significant

not significant

1,596

not significant

Source: USITC, 1990, supra note 6, at 273.
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because they were "primarily aimed at rendering effective restrictions on domestic
production or consumption" of an exhaustible natural resource-- dolphins.'
a. Article XX(b)
Article XX(b) provides an exception for measures "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health," provided that such measures are not applied in an
arbitrary, unjustifiable, or discriminatory manner.65 The Panel addressed Mexico's
arguments that Article XX(b) could not apply to measures undertaken outside the
jurisdiction of the U.S. and that even if Article XX(b) did apply, the import
prohibition was not "necessary" to protect dolphins.6 6 The text of Article XX(b) did
not indicate the extent of protection a contracting part could render outside its
jurisdiction.67

' TunalDolphin I, PanelReport, 30 I.L.M., at 1620. The question arose over whether
the U.S. was really concerned about the depletion of dolphins or whether they were more
concerned over the increase in competition between Mexican tuna products and domestic
tuna products. See USITC, 1990, supranote 6, at 279 (illustrating that the volume of frozen
tuna exports from Mexico increased from 32,039 short tons to 92,594 short tons between
1985 and 1989, nearly a three-fold increase).
65 GATT art. XX(b). See supra note 62, at art. XX (setting forth the complete text of
Article XX and its concomitant requirement that the principles of the preamble be satisfied
before a contracting party can assert one of the exceptions).
66 Tuna/Dolphin I, PanelReport, 30 I.L.M. at 1619 (describing Mexico's assertion that
alternatives to the intermediary and direct embargoes could come in the form of multilateral,
international agreements).
67 Id. at 1620; see also Pedrozo, UnreasonableExtension, supra note 14, at 101-02
(providing a comprehensive analysis of the reasonableness of the U.S.'s assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States). Article 38(1) of the International Court of Justice Statute (ICJ Statute)
lists four sources of international law from which the U.S. could draw to substantiate its
right to exert extraterritorial jurisdiction: (1) rules and principles set forth in treaties to which
the contesting parties are members; (2) international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law; (3) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
and (4) judicial decisions interse (between the parties), i.e. not erga omnes (prior decisions
between other parties) and scholarly works from the most highly qualified publicists of
various nations. Statute of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 1983 U.N.Y.B. 1334, 1336,
U.N. Sales No. E.86.I.1 (statute entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). These sources of law are
listed in an implicit hierarchy, treaties being controlling if both contesting parties are
members. Customary principles of international law are also a legitimate source of law.
See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (examining the practices of several European
Countries in determining that fishing vessels were exempt from capture as prizes of war as
a customary principle of international law; and noting that duration of practice among states
and opinio juris (consent to be bound by the practice) determined the existence of a
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/5
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Referring to the drafting history of GATT and to a prior panel report indicating
that the "necessary" requirements "refer to the trade measures requiring justification
under Article XX(b), [and] not ... to the life or health standard chosen by the
contracting party," the Panel determined that a contracting party could pursue
public policy goals that were inconsistent with GATT to the extent they were
unavoidable.6" Thus, the Panel read the exception narrowly based on the concern
that otherwise, "each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or
health protection policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate

customary principle). Under what is known as the "effects doctrine," a state may proscribe
conduct occurring outside its territory when there is a substantial effect on its territory as a
customary principle of law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHEFOREIGN RELATIONS LAWOFTHE
UNITED STATES, § 402(1)(c) (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. However, this
principle is conditioned on the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction being reasonable when
considering some of the following factors set forth in §403(2) of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD):
a. The extent to which the activity takes place within the regulating state, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating state;
b. The connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated, or between that state and those whom the law or regulation is designed
to protect;
c. The character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted.
Id. While no one factor is determinative, it is clear that the U.S. had a difficult time
asserting that its exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction was reasonable before the GATT"
Panel. Tuna/DolphinI,PanelReport,30 I.L.M. at 1605 (addressing Mexico's argument that
the U.S.'s obligations under GATT were determinative and Mexico's statement that "[t]o
accept that one contracting party might impose trade restrictions to conserve resources of
another contracting party would have the consequence of introducing the concept of
extraterritoriality into the GATT, which would be extremely dangerous for all contracting
parties.").
68 Tuna/DolphinI,PanelReport, 30 I.L.M. at 1605 (referring to the New York draft of
the International Trade Organization (ITO) Charter and the Panel Report on "ThailandRestrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes," adopted 7 November 1990,
B.I.S.D. 37S/200, 222-23, DS1O/R, paras. 73-74). The Panel concluded that the Second
Session of the Prepatory Committee in Geneva, who were partially responsible for drafting
Article XX(b), perceived the exception as allowing for the use of sanitary regulations to
"safeguard life or health of humans, animals or plant life within the jurisdiction of the
importing country." Id. at 1620 (citing EPCT/A/PV/307-15). Measures to protect dolphins
presented a problem according to the Panel, in linking the jurisdiction of the U.S. to the
proviso. See Pedrozo, Unreasonable Extension, supra note 14, at 104 (discussing the
unreasonableness of the U.S.'s extension of jurisdiction, especially when the use of purse
seine fleets by U.S. fisherman had declined since the 1981 amendments to the MMPA).
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without jeopardizing their fights under the General Agreement.

69

As the party invoking the Article XX exception, the U.S. had the burden of
showing that it had "exhausted all options reasonably available to it to pursue its
dolphin protection objectives" by way of international agreements consistent with
GATT.70 Ignoring the fact that the U.S. had attempted to establish an international
agreement to resolve the depletion of dolphin populations in the ETP for nearly
forty years" , the Panel concluded that the measure chosen by the U.S. was not

69

Tuna/Dolphin I, PanelReport, 30 I.L.M., at 1620. It should also be noted that the

Panel did not find the MMPA's tuna labeling scheme GATI' violative. Id. at 1616
(reasoning that "the use of the label 'Dolphin Safe' is not a requirement but is voluntary.").
On May 28, 1991, the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA) took effect.
16 U.S.C. § 1385 (Supp. 1977). Section 1385 (d)(1) incorporates the DPCIA's labeling
requirements into the MMPA and specifically provides in part that:
(1) It is a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act for any
producer, importer, exporter, distributor, or seller of any tuna product that is
exported from or offered for sale in the United States to include on the label of that
product the term "Dolphin Safe" or any other term or symbol that falsely claims or
suggests that the tuna contained in the product was harvested using a method of
fishing that is not harmful to dolphins if the product contains-(A) tuna harvested on the high seas by a vessel engaged in driftnet fishing; or
(B) tuna harvested in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean by a vessel using purse
seine nets which do not meet the requirements for being considered dolphin safe
16 U.S.C. § 1385(d)(1)(A-B) (Supp. 1997). The labeling provisions contained within the
MMPA did not trouble the Panel because whether or not importers of tuna products chose
to place a "Dolphin Safe" label was entirely up to the producer. See BorderlessBelievability
(speech by Ketchum Public Relations Worldwide CEO David R. Drobois), Feb. 15, 1997
VrrAL SPEECHES 281, available in 1997 WL 10024365 (pages unavailable
online)(describing how Star-Kist, the world's largest tuna producer, gained significant
advantages by adopting a "Dolphin Safe" labeling policy, not only in the U.S., but through
its subsidiaries in Australia and Europe).
70 Tuna/Dolphin I, Panel Report, 30 I.L.M. at 1620 (noting that the "negotiation of
international cooperative arrangements ... would seem to be desirable in view of the fact
that dolphins" are a highly migratory species). The panel also determined that tuna product
ban was arbitrary and unpredictable. Id. The quota limit under 16 U.S.C. § 1371 for foreign
imports of tuna products was linked to the taking rate of U.S. fisherman during the same
period and applied retroactively. Id. (stating that "the Mexican authorities could not know
whether, at a given point of time, their policies conformed to the United States' dolphin
protection standards.").
71 Steve Charnovitz, Dolphins and Tuna: Analysis of the Second GATT PanelReport,
24ENVT'LL. REP. 10,567, 10,570-71 (1994) [hereinafter Chamovitz, Dolphins] (discussing
earlier international trade conferences aimed at marine mammal conservation). For example,
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/5
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necessary within the meaning of Article XX(b).72 The effect of the Panel's decision
meant that a contracting party could only invoke measures to protect health and
safety within its own jurisdiction and not extraterritorially.
b. Article XX(g)
Consistent with the fears expressed with allowing an extraterritorial reading of
Article XX(b), the Panel construed Article XX(g) to permit a contracting party to
take "trade measures primarily aimed at rendering effective restrictions on
production or consumption within their jurisdiction. 73 However, the embargo
placed on Mexico was aimed at conserving dolphins as an exhaustible resource
outside of U.S. jurisdiction. Despite the absence of language limiting its
jurisdictional scope, the Panel concluded that the import ban on Mexican tuna
products could not be justified under Article XX(g).74

the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATIC) was a bilateral fishing agreement
between Costa Rica and the U.S. established in 1950. Convention for the Establishment of
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, May 31, 1949, U.S. - Costa Rica, 1 U.S.T. 230
(other member states now include: Panama, Ecuador, Canada, Japan, France and NicaraguaMexico and Costa Rica have withdrawn their membership). However, the IATTC had little
effect until 1976 when reported its intention to implement the following goals:
(1) [To] strive to maintain a high level of tuna production and
(2) also to maintain porpoise stocks at or above levels that assure their survival in
perpetuity,
(3) with every reasonable effort being made to avoid needless or careless killing of
porpoise.
PEDROZO, UNREASONABLE EXTENSION, supra note 14, at 95 (quoting U.S. INTL TRADE
COMM'N, PUB. No. 2547, TUNA: CuRRENT IssuEs AFFECTING THE U.S. INDUSTRY, REPORT
TO THE SENATE COMMITrEE OF FINANCE 3-2 (1992)). This statement of policy established
a monitoring mechanism for fishing practices and performance of fishing fleets in the ETP.
Id. Not until 1992, was the IATTC successful in establishing "the first ever multilateral
agreement to protect dolphins in the ETP. Id. at 96 (discussing the La Jolla Conference held
in California, which finally gave some teeth to the IATTC program by gaining a commitment
from various nations to firmly reduce dolphin mortality by 80 percent between 1993 and
1999).
72 Tuna/Dolphin I, Panel Report, 30 I.L.M. at 1620.
I at 1621 (the Panel repeated its slippery slope argument used to justify its finding
Id.
with regard to Article XX(b): If the U.S. interpretation of Article XX(g) were accepted,
"each contracting party could unilaterally determine the conservation policies from which
other contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the
General Agreement.").
71 Id. (adding, however, that it made no finding as to whether the U.S. measures could
be applied extraterritorially if they met Article XX(g)'s requirement that they be "primarily
aimed at" dolphin conservation); see also Spracker and Lundsgaard, Dolphins and Tuna,
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3. Conclusion
Tuna/Dolphin I represented the first challenge to the MMPA's trade provisions
76
at an international level. 75 Although the Panel's decision was not binding , its
recommendation that the U.S. bring its conservation measures into conformity with
its obligations under GATT caused a stir among environmental groups and the Bush
Administration." Clearly these pressures and the interests in achieving membership
into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are what led Mexico to
78
The
withdraw its GATT complaint, rendering the Panel decision unadopted.
Panel's assurance that their decision would not affect "the rights of individual
contracting parties to pursue their internal environmental policies and to cooperate

supranote 18, at 398-99 (discussing the absence of explicit language limiting the scope of
Article XX(g) and stating that "[s]ince the import ban was designed to conserve an
exhaustible natural resource outside of the jurisdiction of the United States, specifically
dolphin stocks in the ETP, it could not be justified under Article XX(g)).
75 See Yechout, In the Wake of Tuna II, supra note 5, at 253 (noting that until 1990 no
embargoes had been placed on foreign tuna products).
76 But see Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(Annex 2 to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization), April 15, 1994, art.
16, para. 4, art. 17, para. 14, reprintedin 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1235, 1237 (eliminating the prior
practice under GATT, which permitted countries to block adoption of panel decisions
against them). Article 17, para. 14 specifically provides:
An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body]
and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides
by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within 30 days following its
circulation to the Members.
Id. at 1237.
" See Steve Charnovitz, Green Roots, BadPruning:GATTRules and TheirApplication
to Environmental Trade Measures, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299, 302 (1994) [hereinafter
Charnovitz, Green Roots] ("the decision startled American environmental organizations,
making them deeply concerned when they realized that the panel's logic could be applied
to invalidate numerous other environmental laws . . . . Once it became clear how
troublesome the GATT panel's decision was, the Bush Administration convinced Mexico
not to seek adoption of the panel report within the GATT."). Marianne Lavelle, Free Trade
v. Law, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 29, 1993, 1 [hereinafter Lavelle, Free Trade] (including the
Tuna/Dolphin decisions as the "seminal trade/environmental case, prompted in part by a
domestic conflict between U.S. environmentalists and the Reagan/Bush administration.").
" Lavelle, Free Trade, supra note 77, at 38. ("Since Mexico's top international
economic priority was the negotiation of NAFTA, Mexico was willing to suspend its GATY
complaint in the interest of securing environmentalist support for NAFTA."). Id. at 1
(noting that the "tuna/dolphin ruling was never finalized because both Mexico and the
United States, fearing the political reaction at home while in the throes of bilateral trade
negotiations, quickly worked out a settlement.").
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/5
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with one another in harmonizing such policies" did not erase memories of futile
attempts to expand internal environmental policies.7 9
Nevertheless, the Bush Administration agreed to lift the MMPA embargo against
any country that agreed to suspend purse seine fishing for five years and supported
Congress' enactment of the International Dolphin Conservation Act (IDCA) in
1992.80 The IDCA amended the MMPA by adding a section that authorizes the

" Tuna/DolphinI, PanelReport,30 I.L.M. 1594, 1622 (1991); see also Daniel P. Blank,
Note, Target-Based Environmental Trade Measures: A Proposalfor the New WTO
Committee on Trade andEnvironment, 15 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 61, 68-72 (1996) (discussing
the diminishing effectiveness of International Conservation Programs in the light of the 1994
Taiwan case involving the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES)). The Panel referred to three other cases in which states attempted to impose
conservation measures that were unsuccessful due to pre-existing trade obligations: (1)
European Communities v. Denmark, Case 302/86, ECR 4607 (1988), where the European
Court of Justice, applying the EC Treaty rule similar to the GATT rule that "necessary"
measures are those which prove the "least restrictive," objected to a Danish law that limited
the sale of non-returnable beer containers; (2) In the Matter of Canada's Landing
Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, Secretariat File No. CDA-89-1807
(1989), where the U.S./Canada Free Trade Act Panel rejected, as non-tariff trade barrier,
Canada's regulation requiring that all salmon and herring caught in Canadian waters be
brought ashore before exportation; and (3) Thailand- Restrictions on Importation of and
Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT Doc. DS1O/R (1990), where a GATT Panel declared
that a domestic ban on imported cigarettes was not a "necessary" health measure. Lavelle,
Free Trade, supra note 77, at 38.
80 Yechout, In the Wake of Tuna II, supra note 5, at 259 (discussing the debate within
the Bush Administration that to the enactment of the International Dolphin Conservation Act
of 1992, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418). The result of the Panel report created a debate in
Congress between supporters of two different bills calling for an amendment to the MMPA.
See Perkins, Does Might Make Right, supra note 9, at 236-40 (providing an excellent
analysis of the events leading up to the enactment of the IDCA and its resulting provisions).
From the Senate, the "Breaux bill" was introduced to implement the La Jolla Agreement
established in relation to the IAT'C, with the objective of:
(1) progressively reducing dolphin mortality in the eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO)
fishery to levels approaching zero through the setting of annual limits and
(2), with a goal of eliminating dolphin mortality in this fishery, seeking ecologically
sound means of capturing large yellowfin tunas not in association with dolphins
while maintaining the populations of yellowfin tuna in the EPO at a level which
will permit maximum sustained catches year after year, and to limit and, if possible,
eliminate the mortality of dolphins in the fishery of the EPO [to a mortality
percentage of less than 8 by 1999].
Agreement for the Reduction of Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO),
June, 1992, done at La Jolla, Calif., reprintedin 33 I.L.M. 936,938 (1992); see also Perkins,
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Secretary of State to enter into international agreements to prohibit certain tuna
harvesting practices. 81 Although the IDCA attempted to harmonize the conflicts
between conservation efforts and GATT obligations by encouraging multilateral
negotiations, the European Economic Community and the Netherlands did not find
this an adequate means of obtaining relief.82
B. Tuna/Dolphin II, 1994
In June of 1992, the European Economic Community (EEC) requested the
Contracting Parties to establish a dispute panel pursuant to Article XXII: 2 of
GATT. s3 Soon after, the Netherlands requested to be joined in the EEC's

Does Might Make Right, supra note 9, at 237 (discussing Senator Breaux of Louisiana's
proposed amendment to the MMPA, which would act to eliminate rather than merely reduce
dolphin mortality.).
From the House of Representatives, Congressman Studds of Massachusetts proposed an
amendment to the MMPA which was eventually adopted by Congress as the IDCA. 138
CONG. REc. H9064-02 (1992); 138 CONG. REc. S17840-05 (1992) (House and Senate
hearings finalizing the essence of the IDCA). The result of the Congressional debate led to
the addition of Subchapter IV to the MMPA. 16 U.S.C. § 1411-1418. (1992) (discussed
infra note 81 and accompanying text.).
8 16 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1994). The incentive offered by the IDCA, i.e. the lifting of any
tuna embargo for any state agreeing to comply with the moratorium, directly stems from the
tuna dolphin dispute. See 138 CONG. REC. S17840-05, S17841 (1992) (declaring that the
timing of the IDCA was important "because current provisions of the MMPA have resulted
in an embargo of tuna and tuna products from Mexico and Venezuela, two of the most
prominent foreign fleets in the ETP," and the MMPA had failed to fully achieve its goal of
"ending the needless destruction of marine mammals.")-. -The lifting of the-embargo-would
have its price, as any state seeking to take advantage of the immunity from the embargo
would have to comply with certification requirementi-s s-taing that they-had-st tistically
reduced their mortality levels from.199-1-toasignifiant-degree. 6U.S.C4-§415(a)-(Supp
1997).
82 See General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade Dispute Settlement Panel, United States
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter
Tuna/Dolphin II, PanelReport]; see also USITC, 1990, supra note 6, at 188-189 (noting
that "Europe is second only to the U.S. market in terms of canned tuna consumption,"
leading to the conclusion that an intermediary embargo imposed by the U.S. against the
import of tuna products would not be consistent with the EC's interests, despite the IDCA
amendments).
83 Tuna/Dolphin II, Panel Report, 33 I.L.M. at 844. See supra notes 42-43 and
accompanying text (discussing the consultation procedure under Article XXII of GATT).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/5
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complaint.84 Once again the subject of the dispute was the U.S.'s restrictions on the
importation of tuna products. Although Mexico satisfied its dispute with the U.S.
using a resolution-through-negotiation approach, the co-complainants before the
Tuna/Dolphin II Panel did not find this to be an amenable alternative to outright
elimination of the intermediary nation embargoes.85
After the parties concluded consultations regarding the new IDCA amendments
to the MMPA, the Panel resumed its proceedings and addressed those provisions
relevant to the intermediary embargoes under the MMPA.86 Similar to Mexico's

84

Tuna/DolphinII, PanelReport,33 I.L.M. at 844. (indicating that both the Netherlands

and the EEC engaged in consultations with the U.S. pursuant to Article XXIII: 2).
Following the EEC's lead, the Netherlands requested a panel to resolve its dispute with the
U.S. on July 14, 1992. Id. Spain and France are the principal harvesting nations in the
European Community (EC). USITC, 1990, supra note 6, at 178. However, most of their
yellowfin tuna harvesting operations using purse seine vessels occur in the western Indian
Ocean and not the ETP. Id. at 179. Hence, of primary concern to most of the EEC,
including the Netherlands, was the intermediary embargo imposed by the U.S. against the
imports of tuna from nations who permit the use of purse seine nets to catch tuna.
Tuna/Dolphin11, PanelReport, 33 I.L.M., at 849 (discussing the MMPA's requirement that
any state identified as an intermediary nation must certify that it had barred the import of
tuna from any nation that was barred from directly importing tuna into the U.S.). The
following table illustrates the major European importers of canned tuna between 1985-1989:
CANNED TUNA: EUROPEAN IMPORTS, 1985-1989 (in thousands of metric tons)
MARKET

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

United Kingdom

34

33

32

44

61

France

22

34

44

51

45

West Germany

18

24

29

26

30

Netherlands

2

3

5

5

6

TOTAL:EC

87

110

133

150

166

Source: USITC, 1990, supra note 6 (also indicating that the Netherlands exported only a
negligible amount of tuna products during this time period, which raises a question of how
negatively they were impacted by the prospect of an MMPA embargo).
85 See Yechout, In the Wake of Tuna II, supra note 5, at 263 (discussing the EU and the
Netherlands complaint before the GA'IT Panel).
86 Tuna/Dolphin II, PanelReport, 33 I.L.M. at 845 (noting that the EEC requested a
pause in the proceedings on October 12, 1992, followed by the Netherlands similar request
on October 30, 1992, which was granted by the Chairman of the Panel on November 16,
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request in Tuna/Dolphin I, the EEC and the Netherlands requested the Panel to
recommend that the U.S. amend the MMPA to bring the Act into conformity with
7
its obligations under GATT.1
First, the co-complainants asked the Panel to find that the "intermediary nation
embargo" provisions under § 1371(a)(2)(C) of the MMPA violated Article XI of
GATT and did not qualify as an internal regulation under Article III and Ad Article
HI of the trade agreement. Second, the Panel was asked to make the same findings
with regard to the MMPA's "primary nation embargo" provisions and the recent
amendment added by the IDCA. 89 Finally, the Panel was urged to declare that the
exceptions under Article XX of GATT were inapplicable to measures taken by a
contracting member outside its jurisdiction.9"

1992). The disputing parties agreed that certain amendments to the MMPA made by the
IDCPA and by the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act "could be considered in
the course of the Panel proceeding." Id. The specific provision of the IDCA to be
considered by the Panel was the new Section 305 of the MMPA, added by Section 2(a) of
the IDCA. Id; see also supra notes 80, 81, and accompanying text (discussing the IDCA
amendments to the MMPA).
87 Tuna/DolphinII, Panel Report, 33 I.L.M. at 850. The United States requested that
the Panel find that it was not possible to determine whether the embargos imposed pursuant
to Section 305(a) of the MMPA in the future would be consistent with GATT or whether
they fell within in Article XX's exceptions under GATT, "since these measures would be
imposed in the context of a specific agreement between sovereigns .... ." Id. at 850-51
(referring to the La Jolla Agreement to the IATTC (see supranote 80 and accompanying text
(discussing the La Jolla Agreement)).
88 Tuna/Dolphin II, Panel Report, 33 I.L.M. at 850. Specifically the EEC and the
Netherlands requested the Panel to:
find that the import prohibitions on tuna and tuna products imposed pursuant to
Section 101(a)(2)(C) of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (the 'intermediary
nation embargo') were contrary to Article XI of the General Agreement, did not
qualify as a border adjustment under Article II and the relevant not to that Article,
and was not covered by any of the exceptions under Article XX.
Id.
89 Id. Specifically the co-complainants requested the Panel to:
find that the import prohibitions on tuna and tuna products imposed pursuant to
Section 101 (a)(2) and Section 305 (a)(1) and (2) of the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (the 'primary nation embargo') were contrary to Article XI of the
General Agreement, did not qualify as a border adjustment under Article III, and
was not covered by any of the exceptions of Article XX.
Id.
' Id. at 851 (referring to the co-complainants argument that the border measure "was
merely a convenient way of enforcing an internal law ... ."). The issue of extraterritorial

application of environmental measures was the essence of both the Tuna/Dolphin disputes.
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1. GATT Issues Raised
The Tuna/Dolphin II Panel applied the same analysis of Article III and Article
XI as was applied in Tuna/Dolphin I. The Panel declared that the intermediary
nation embargo imposed by the U.S. under the MMPA was not ajustifiable measure
"relating to the enforcement at the time or point of importation of an internal law,
regulation or requirement that applied equally to the imported product and the like
domestic product" under Article III of GATT.91 Thus, the intermediary embargo
constituted an impermissible quantitative restriction under Article XI: 1.92
Although neither the EEC nor the Netherlands were affected by the primary
nation embargo provisions at the time of the dispute, the Panel concluded that the
U.S. left no discretion to the executive charged with imposing such a measure.93

See Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming U.S. Trade Policy to Protect the Global Environment:
A MultilateralApproach, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 185, 203-4, 227 (1994) [hereinafter
Kennedy, A MultilateralApproach](discussing the problems with unilateral trade sanctions
and efforts to regulate the global environment under the U.S.'s "holier than thou" approach).
"' Tuna/DolphinII, PanelReport, 33 I.L.M. at 889 (adding that the embargoes were a
quantitative restriction in violation of Article XI: 1); see also supra Part 11, Section A (1)
(discussing Article II and Article XI of GATT in Tuna/Dolphin 1).
9 Tuna/DolphinII, PanelReport, 33 I.L.M. at 889 (noting that the U.S. did not dispute
the claims of the EU and the Netherlands, but merely claimed that they bore the burden of
proving that import restrictions were a quantitative restriction). Compare Canada-Import,
Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies: Panel
Report, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 27 (1993) (also the subject of a previous GAIT
Panel report in 1988 stemming from a complaint brought by the European Union). In that
case, the Heileman Brewing Company and the U.S. alleged, in part, that Canada had violated
the national treatment principle of Article 111:4 of GAIT by imposing an environmental tax
on non-refillable alcohol containers. See Lisa Crosby, Note, Green Beer: When is an
Environmental Measure a Disguised Restriction on InternationalTrade?, 7 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 538-41 (analyzing the GATT panel decision and section 302(a) of the
Trade Act of 1974 under which the U.S. brought its claim as well). The essence of the
complaint was that Canada's provincial liquor boards permitted their domestic brewers to
"deliver beer directly to the point of sale while requiring foreign beer distributors to ship to
the liquor boards, who in turn delivered the product to retail outlets." Id. at 540 (noting that
the U.S. was not complaining of the tax itself only the discriminatory delivery system). The
GAIT Panel held that the delivery system was inconsistent with Article IH:4, since it
required of foreign beer distributors something not required of domestic beer distributors.
Id. at 541.
9' Tuna/Dolphin II, Panel Report, 33 I.L.M., at 889 (discussing two previous panel
decisions holding that "legislation requiring the executive to act contrary to obligations
under the General Agreement was inconsistent with the General Agreement, whether or not
the legislation had actually been applied in a particular case.") (citing Reports of the panels
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This left open the possibility that the co-complainants would be subjected to the
embargo should they fail to meet the standards required under the MMPA.94 For
that reason, the Panel found that the primary embargo violated Article XI: 1 as well.
2. GATT's General Exceptions
Once again the U.S. argued that even if both the primary and intermediary nation
embargoes were inconsistent with Articles III and XI, the measures fell within
GATT's General Exception provisions under Article XX. 95 The U.S. asserted that
the MMPA could be justified under Articles XX(b), XX(g), and XX(d).96 Although
the Panel eventually arrived at the same conclusion as the Tuna/Dolphin I Panel, its
analysis was quite different and may have opened the door for contracting members
of GATT to legitimately promote conservation efforts extraterritorially 9 7

on the United States- Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, June 17, 1987,
GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136 (1988); EEC- Regulation on Imports of Parts and
Components, May 16, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 132 (1991).
9' Tuna/Dolphin II, Panel Report, 33 I.L.M. at 889 (rejecting the United States'

argument that the co-complainants essentially had no standing to challenge the primary and
secondary embargoes unless they had, in fact, been affected themselves).
9 Tuna/Dolphin I, PanelReport, 33 I.L.M. at 852. Compare with supra notes 62-63

and accompanying text (addressing Article XX of GATT and the exceptions discussed in
Tuna/Dolphin I).

See GATT art. XX(b),(g),(d). The text of Articles XX(b) and XX(g) of GATT is set
forth supra note 62. Article XX(d) provides:
[nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures:] necessary to secure compliance
with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of
monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the
protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive
practices.
GAT 194, art. XX(d), as amended (1994).
97 JACKSON, supra note 37, at § 12.3, pp. 584. While the Panel recognized that the
nations could impose extraterritorial measures, it was also careful to note that GATT would
not allow unilateral boycotts as a means of achieving domestic policy goals. See id. (citing
Tuna/DolphinI, Panel Report, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994), and comparing the United Nations
Conference on the Environment and Development's Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, which states in Principle 12 that "[e]nvironmental measures addressing
transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on
96

international consensus." 31 I.L.M. at 878).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/5
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a. Article XX(g)

In contrast to Tuna/Dolphin I, the Panel first addressed the applicability of
Article XX(g) as justification for the U.S. trade embargoes. The Panel read Article
XX(g) to require a three prong analysis. First, the Panel considered whether the
policies asserted by the U.S. for justification of its primary and intermediary nation
embargoes were consistent with Article XX(g)'s allowance for measures "to
conserve exhaustible natural resources. 'g The fact that dolphin populations could
potentially be exhausted regardless of whether their populations were presently
depleted, was enough to satisfy the Panel that the MMPA's program to conserve
dolphins was a policy to conserve an exhaustible resource.99
Both the EEC and the Netherlands argued that even if dolphins were considered
an exhaustible resource, the measures taken to conserve them could not be applied
extraterritorially.100 Like the Tuna/Dolphin I panel, this Panel stated that neither
Article XX(g), nor any other provisions of GATT specifically limited the location
of the exhaustible resource that could be conserved. 10 1 However, the Panel found
that other provisions in Article XX and in GATT itself did not bar measures taken

Tuna/Dolphin II, PanelReport,33 I.L.M. at 890 (addressing the U.S.'s argument that
the extraterritorial measures taken under the MMPA related to the conservation of dolphins
as an exhaustible natural resource and that such measures were taken in "conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production and consumption" as required by Article XX(g) of
98

GATr).
99 Id. at 891; see also Pedrozo, Unreasonable Extension, supra note 14, at 110
(emphasizing through analysis of data on dolphin mortality in 1991 that "dolphin
populations in the ETP are not endangered by current purse seine fishing practices.").
However, this factor did not concern the GATT Panel in 1994. Tuna/Dolphin II, Panel
Report, 33 I.L.M. at 891. The Panel, finding "that dolphin stocks could potentially be
exhausted, and that the basis of a policy to conserve them did not depend on whether at
present their stocks were depleted, accepted that a policy to conserve dolphins was a policy
to conserve an exhaustible natural resource." Id.
'00 Tuna/Dolphin II, Panel Report, 33 I.L.M. at 891 (noting the co-complainants
interpretation of Article XX(g), which went beyond the strict reading of the text and
centered around the object and purpose of GATT as a whole).
'o'
Id. at 891-92. But see Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-EnvironmentNegotiationsin the
EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectoriesof Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'LL. 231,
238 (1997) [hereinafter Steinberg, EU, NAFTA, AND WTO] (interpreting the GA'IT/WTO's
position on extraterritorial environmental activity as adverse to restrictions on imports of
goods are based on one nation's view of what is environmentally unsound).
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outside of contracting members' territorial jurisdiction. 0 2 In fact, under general
international law "states are not in principle barred from regulating the conduct of
their nationals" with respect to natural resources outside their territory. 0 3 Thus, for
the first time, a GATT panel found that Article XX(g) placed no limits on
extraterritorial measures to conserve natural resources."
Next, the Panel considered whether the MMPA's prohibitions on foreign tuna
products were made "in conjunction" with restrictions on domestic products and
whether these measures were "related to" the conservation of an exhaustible natural
resource. The term "related to" was defined as "primarily aimed at the conservation
of resources" by a previous panel.10 5 The Panel noted that the intermediary
embargo encompassed the import of tuna products from such countries whether or
not the tuna was harvested in a manner that was in fact harmful to dolphins.0 6
Therefore, the intermediary nation embargo "could not, by itself, further the United
States conservation objectives"- protecting dolphins. 7 Similarly, the primary
nation embargo permitted subjected countries to harvest tuna in a manner that was
harmful to dolphins so long as their practices and policies were comparable to U.S.
standards.10 s

102

Tuna/Dolphin II, Panel Report, 33 I.L.M. at 891-92 (identifying, as an example,

Article XX(e) which relates to a GAT exception for prison labor and which clearly was not
intended to apply only to measures imposed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the party
taking the measure).
103 Id. at 892.
10 Yechout, In the Wake of Tuna I, supra note 5, at 264-65 ("the Tuna II panel

explicitly rejected the Tuna I panel's conclusion that extrajurisdictional measures were
contrary to the GATT.").
105

Tuna/Dolphin II, Panel Report, 33 I.L.M. at 893 (citing, Canada -- Measures

Affecting the Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, March 22, 1988, GATT
B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (1989) ("the purpose of including Article XX(g) in the General
Agreement was not to widen the scope for measures serving trade policy purpose but merely
to ensure that the commitments under the General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of
policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustive natural resources.") (internal quotations

omitted).
106 Tuna/Dolphin II, Panel Report, 33 I.L.M. at 893. See Peter V. Michaud, Note,
Caughtin a Trap: The European Union Leghold Trap Debate, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
355, 370-72 (1997) [hereinafter Michaud, Caught in a Trap] (describing the Panel's

conclusion that "related to" and "in conjunction with" meant "primarily aimed at" in the
context of Article XX(g)).
Panel Report, 33 I.L.M. at 893-94.
1' Tuna/DolphinII,
10' Id. (describing it another way the Panel noted: "measures taken under the primary

nation embargo prohibited imports from a country of any tuna, whether or not the particular
tuna was harvested in a way that harmed or could harm dolphins, as long as the country's
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/5
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The Panel concluded that both the primary and intermediary nation embargoes
could only accomplish their protection objectives by forcing other countries to
change their own domestic policies in accordance with the policies of the U.S.'0 9
GATT simply does not permit contracting parties to impose trade embargoes to
effect such changes. Accordingly, the Panel found the preamble to Article XX- the
0
final prong of its analysis- inapposite. '1
b. Article XX(b)
Consistent with its analysis of Article XX(g), the Panel determined that Article
XX(b) required a three prong analysis. The first prong demanded a determination
of whether the policies underlying the MMPA fell within the exception's policies
of protecting "human, animal or plant life or health.""' The EEC argued that the
exception could not be invoked to justify measures taken outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the party asserting the protective measures." 2 Following the
reasoning it employed with respect to Article XX(g), the Panel declared that neither
the language of Article XX(b), nor general principles of international law barred a
of measures to protect "persons, animals,
state from the extraterritorial 'application
13
plants and natural resources." "

tuna harvesting practices and policies were not comparable to those of the United States.").
'09 Id. at 894 ("both the primary and intermediary nation embargoes on tuna implemented
by the United States were taken so as to force other countries to change their policies with
respect to persons and things within their own jurisdiction, since the embargoes required
such changes in order to have any effect on the conservation of dolphins.").
110 TunalDolphin II, Panel Report, 33 I.L.M. at 891 (quoting GATT, art. XX.). See
supra note 62 and accompanying text (outlining the text of Article XX's preamble and its
subsequent exceptions); see also Tuna/Dolphin I1,PanelReport, 33 I.L.M. at 894 (noting
that the "long-standing practice of panels has.., been to interpret [Article XX] narrowly,"
and expressing a fear that to interpret Article XX broadly would be to undermine the
efficacy of GATT as a multilateral agreement).
See David A. Wirth, A
"' Tuna/Dolphin II, Panel Report, 33 I.L.M. at 895.
Matchmaker's Challenge:MarryingInternationalLaw andAmerican EnvironmentalLaw,
32 VA. J. INT'L L. 377, 406-9 (1992) (analyzing the United States' statutory scheme for

controlling contaminants in food and noting that "the exceptions in the GAT' for trade
measures directed at the protection of animal life or health or the conservation of natural
resources must be narrowly construed.").
112 Tuna Dolphin II, PanelReport, 33 I.L.M. at 896 (noting, that the parties agreed that
the protection of dolphins fell within the policies of Article XX(b), but that the cocomplainants did not agree that the U.S. had a right to pursue its policies extraterritorially).
13Id. at 892 (recalling its finding that "[a] state may in particular regulate the conduct
of its fisherman, or of vessels having its nationality or any fisherman on these vessels, with
respect to fish located in the high seas."); see alsoRESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 67 and
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The second prong required the Panel to determine whether the primary and
secondary embargoes were measures" 'necessary' to protect the human, animal or
plant life or health." The Panel replicated its analysis and conclusion under Article
XX(g), reasoning that the MMPA could not directly promote its objectives unless
the internal policies of sanctioned nations resembled those of the U.S.' 14 Finally,
Article XX(b) required a determination as to whether the requirements of Article
XX's preamble had been met. Again, the Panel refused to consider the third
requirement of the exception since the U.S. had not satisfied the condition that its
protective measures were "necessary" under Article XX(b).115
c. Article XX(d)
The U.S. attempted to further justify its intermediary nation embargo by
invoking Article XX(d). This exception provides that a nation may take measures
"necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent
with" other GATT provisions.' 16 Referring to its finding that the primary nation
embargo was inconsistent with Article XI: 1, the Panel concluded that the
intermediary nation embargo could not be justified under the explicit language of
Article XX(d). 117 Thus, having declared that the MMPA was inconsistent with
GATT, the Panel also found that the Act could not be saved by any of the
exceptions provided under Article XX.
3. Conclusion
Although the Tuna/Dolphin II Panel took a different path through virtually an
identical jungle, it arrived at the same conclusion as the Tuna/Dolphin I Panel. The
accompanying text (discussing customary international law and the "effects doctrine"
permitting, in certain cases, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
114 Tuna/Dolphin II, PanelReport, 33 I.L.M. at 897-98; see also Michaud, Caughtin a
Trap, supra note 106, at 372-73 (discussing the EU's 1991 regulation prohibiting the use
of leghold traps or trapping methods that do not meet international trapping standards)
(citing Council Regulation 3254/91 Prohibiting the Use of Leghold Traps in the Community
and the Introduction Into the Community of Pelts and Manufactured Goods of Certain Wild
Animal Species Originating in Countries Which Catch Them By Means of Leghold Traps
or Trapping Methods which Do Not Meet International Humane Trapping Standards, 1991
O.J. (L 308) 1). The EU's leghold trap regulation would seem to run into conflict with
GATT as well, but might be justified by a showing that a ban is necessary for the protection
of animal health. Id.
115 Tuna/Dolphin II, PanelReport, 33 I.L.M. at 897 (reasoning that it would render the
objectives of GATT "seriously impaired.").
116 GATT, art. XX(d). See supra note 96 (outlining the text of Article XX(d)).
117 Tuna/Dolphin I, Panel Report, 33 I.L.M. at 898.
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basic theme throughout both of these decisions was that unilateral actions
attempting to impose environmental policy measures on other nations are not
compatible with GATT.118 However, the Panel recognized dolphin conservation as
a legitimate measure to conserve an exhaustible resource under GATT and found
that such measures could be applied extraterritorially.' 19 Thus, the U.S. could bring
the MMPA within the auspices of the global-trade
agenda using a multilateral
120
approach to environmental conservation.

118

Elliot B. Staffin, Trade Barrier or Trade Boon? A Critical Evaluation of

Environmental Labeling and its Role in the 'Greening' of World Trade, 21 CoLUM. J.
ENvTL. L. 205, 253 (1996) [hereinafter Staffin, Trade Barrier or Trade Boon?] ("as
currently interpreted, GATT simply will not countenance the unilateral attempt by one
country to impose its environmental or conservation PPM [Product or Production] laws on
another through use of a mandatory labeling scheme that enforces an import ban."). Staffin
provides an excellent overview of the dolphin labeling systems of the MMPA, the Dolphin
Protection Information Act, and the Earth Trust's (a non-profit wildlife conservation group)
"Flipper Seal of Approval Scheme," which provide labeling criteria for imports of tuna
products and which enable consumers to reject tuna products that do not satisfy U.S.
standards.
119 Yechout, In the Wake of Tuna II, supra note 5, at 267.
120 See Kennedy, A MultilateralApproach, supra note 90, at 227-28 (proffering that "a
better long-term approach for the United States would be to negotiate multilateral
environmental conventions based upon international consensus, [which would maintain]
American competitiveness in the international economy" and allow for the pursuit of global
environmental goals); see also Jeffrey R. Pike, Statement on H.R. 4089 the International
Dolphin ConservationProgramAct before the Subcommittee on FisheriesConservation,
Wildlife, and Oceans Committee on Resources, April 9, 1997, reported in 4/9/97 CONG.
TMY. 10569290 (setting out the goals and purposes of the IDCPA: "(1) develop a
mechanism that would implement the Panama Declaration, (2) strengthen the dolphin-safe
label to ensure that no dolphins were seriously injured or killed when used on canned tuna,
(3) protect the sovereignty of the United States in establishing science-based standards for
domestic labeling, (4) improve monitoring of tuna fishing operations, and (5) encourage the
IATTC to adopt a bycatch reduction program for ALL yellowfin tuna fisheries in the ETP,
including requirements for releasing alive all sea turtles and other threatened and endangered
species."). The Panama Declaration is an international agreement entered into on October
4, 1995 between the Governments of Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France,
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Spain, Vanuatu, Venezuela, and the U.S., which aims to
conserve fishery resources in the ETP. United States International Trade Commission, The
Year in Trade, 1996: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 48th Report [Part 3 of
4], USITC Pub. 3024, available in 1997 ITC LEXIS 205, 44 [hereinafter USITC, 1996]
(noting the emphatic support of the Clinton administration for the Panama Declaration,
which went into effect upon Congress' approval of the IDCPA in August of 1997).
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IV. MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A STRATEGY FOR
AVOIDING A TUNA/DOLPHIN HI

In the wake of the Tuna/Dolphin decisions, the U.S. has done little to directly
bring the MMPA into conformity with GATT.' Pressures from environmental
groups and the lack of incentives for other nations to enter into multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) are primarily to blame for the apathy shown
towards the panel decisions. From the environmental point of view, the decisions
evidence a retreat from what little global progress has been achieved in reconciling
free trade with conservation of the environment.'2 2 With respect to MEAs,
developing countries who rely on fishing to a greater degree than developed
countries, see little benefit in internalizing environmental costs.'23 By agreeing to
adopt policies that appease the domestic concerns of other contracting members,
developing countries may perceive that their own domestic priorities, such as

121

See PERKINS, DOES MIGHT MAKE RIGHT, supranote 9, at 252-53 (expressing fear that

by failing to utilize multilateral means of regulating the ETP, the U.S. has missed "the
chance to provide meaningful protection for dolphins .... ).
122 See, e.g. David Stoelting, InternationalCourts Flourishin 1990s, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4,
1997, at S2, (col. 1) (noting that the "Tuna Dolphin decision[s] [were] widely regarded as
'hostile to environmental concerns.' "); Dolphin-Harmful Legislation Passes House;
Defenders Say Congress Weakens Dolphin Protection in Name of CorporateTrade, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, May 21, 1997, available in 1997 WL 5712998 (describing House Bill 408, the
legislation introduced by Rep. Wayne Gilchrest (R-MD) to implement the Panama
Declaration of 1995 as the "dolphin-death" bill, because it acts to lift the tuna embargoes on
signatories to the Panama Declaration). This bill was eventually adopted by Congress and
established the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA). See infra note
136 and accompanying text (discussing the IDCPA and its amendments to the MMPA). The
"death-bill" was seen as a response to Mexican demands that the U.S. change its
tuna/dolphin policies after the GAT panel decisions, but Rep. Gilchrest stressed that it had
nothing to do with the Mexican government and was merely an "environmental solution to
a trade problem." Lorraine Woellert, U.S. May Water Down Law Protecting Dolphins
Mexico Uses Trade Threat as Leverage, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), May 20, 1997, at Al.
123 See, e.g. Daniel P. Blank, Note, Target-Based Environmental Trade Measures: A
Proposalfor the New WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
61, 77-96 (1996) [hereinafter Blank, A Proposalfor the New WTO] (discussing the
diverging viewpoints of developed and developing countries with regard to multilateral and
unilateral environmental conservation measures). In particular, the author notes that the
fishing trade is crucial to the economies and diets in Africa and Asia. Id. at 95.
"Developing nations own ninety percent of the coastal waters that lie within the 200-mile
fisheries exclusion zones." Id. at 96 (citing Polly Ghazi, et. al., Focus: The Rape of the
Oceans, OBSERVER, Apr. 2, 1995, at 23).
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124
encouraging economic growth, would be neglected.

As a result of the inability to reach any meaningful solution, the U.S. and other
similarly developed nations have continued to apply unilateral trade restriction
regimes. All this will accomplish is the nascency of another Tuna/Dolphin-like
dispute. 12 The U.S. has incrementally reduced the harsh effect of the MMPA
through some of the amendments contained in the IDCPA, 126 but political

124

See Steinberg, EU, NAFTA, and WTO, supra note 101, at 243 (stating five reasons

developed countries have resisted developing countries positions, one of which being the
latter's desire to improve market access for products).
125 See Paul S. Kibel, Justicefor the Sea Turtle: Marine Conservationand The Court
of InternationalTrade, 15 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 57 (1996-1997) (discussing the
landmark case of Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 922 F.Supp. 616 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1996), where the United States Court of International Trade (CIT), pursuant to the
Endangered Species Act, ordered the Secretary of Commerce and the Department of the
Treasury to prohibit the importation of shrimp from all countries that had not adopted
harvesting methods comparable to U.S. standards for the protection of various endangered
turtle species). The situation in Christopheris remarkably identical to the Tuna/Dolphin
cases and the MMPA's conflict with GATT. One does not have to look too far to see the
prospects of another GATT panel decision emerging in the future. See John A. Duff, Recent
Applicationsof United States Laws to Conserve MarineSpecies Worldwide: Should Trade
Sanctions Be Mandatory?, 2 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 17-19 (1996) (addressing the
inevitable conflictbetween Section 609 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State,
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (16 U.S.C. §1537 (1990)) and
GATT in the context of the Christophercase). However, the United States would seem to
have a stronger case in the shrimp-turtle dispute. In September, 1997, the World Wide Fund
for Nature (WWFN) reported that all five species of turtles involved in Christopherwere
classified by the United Nations as "threatened with extinction." Frances Williams, WTO
Urged to Heed Casefor Turtle-Safe Nets, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at 6.
126 See John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, In the Aftermath of WTO Tuna-Dolphin
Dispute, U.S. Amends Marine Mammal ProtectionAct of 1972 to Permit Imports of Tuna
Harvested in Compliance with InternationalDolphin Conservation Program,3 INT'L L.
UPDATE 114 (Oct. 1997) [hereinafter Schmertz and Meier, In the Aftermath] (reporting on
the passing of the International Dolphin Conservation Program (IDCPA) on August 15,
1997). The IDCPA amends the MMPA to allow the incidental taking of dolphins so long
as companies comply with the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA).
Id. The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC- an international research
organization based at Scripps Institute of Oceanography in La Jolla, California) which was
charged with monitoring the incidental takings of dolphins under the MMPA, must conduct
studies and recommend the adoption of the IDCPA. IDCPA, Pub.L. No. 105-42 [H.R. 408],
111 Stat. 1122 (Aug. 15, 1997). The IDCPA does little to modify the MMPA except to
change the product labeling requirements which was an incidental source of contention in
the Tuna/Dolphin disputes. Schmertz and Meier, In the Aftermath, supra,at 114.
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opposition from environmentalists, who doubt GATT' s receptiveness to meaningful
127
conservation measures, have stymied any real comprehensive changes in the Act.
Nevertheless, a number of approaches have been put forth that may inspire the
international community to recognize the importance of erecting a global framework
for the protection of both trade and environmental interests. Some of these
approaches are briefly outlined in this section.
A. MEAs
In condemning the MMPA, the Tuna/Dolphin panels relied on the availability
128
of MEAs as an alternative to the U.S.'s unilateral attempt to conserve dolphins.
However, it was the failure of these initiatives which instigated the unilateral

127

See, e.g., Bernie Sanders, Left-Right Coalition Comes Together to Defend U.S.

Sovereignty in Trade Issues,GOV'TPRESS RELEASES, Sept. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL
12102846 (manifesting the reason little action has been taken to bring U.S. environmental
matters into compliance with GATT by the Congressman Sanders statement that "the people
of this country have the right to maintain the level of environmental and food safety
standards that they feel are appropriate, and these standards should not be subject to
challenge through the WTO by other countries with weaker standards."). To be fair,
Congressman Sanders was specifically referring to nations without Democratic forms of
government such as LDCs. Yet, even developed countries are bearing the brunt of the
unilateral measures of the U.S. when scientific evidence does not even support a finding
that dolphins are endangered. See Pedrozo, UnreasonableExtension, supranote 14, at 1034 (citing U.S. Int'L Trade Comm'n, Pub. No. 2547, Tuna: Current Issues Affecting the U.S.
Industry, Report to the Senate Committee of Finance 3-1 (1992), which found dolphins
stocks in the ETP healthy and able to sustain viable stock levels).
128See supraParts I-II (discussing Tuna/Dolphin Panel Reports). Presumably the Panels
recognized the numerous multilateral agreements addressing marine pollution problems to
which the United States has acceded to in the past, e.g. Convention on Nature Protection and
Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, Apr. 30, 1942, 161 U.N.T.S. 193;
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Nov.
23, 1961, 17 U.S.T. 138, International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North
Pacific Ocean, May 9, 1952, 4 U.S.T. 380, (proclaimed June 30, 1953); U.N. Special Fund
Project on Caribbean Fishery Development, Apr. 6, 1966, 19 U.S.T. 4938, Convention for
the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, Mar. 3, 1950, 1 U.S.T.
230, Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, May 26, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 185, Convention on
the High Seas, Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2312, Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, Sept. 10, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1606; see also John W. Kindt, The Effect of
Claims by Developing Countrieson LOS InternationalMarine PollutionNegotiations, 20
VA. J. INT'L L. 313, 341 (1980) (outlining over forty-four multilateral marine pollution
agreements, among those listed above, to which the U.S. has consented to be bound).
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measures taken by the U.S. in the first place. 129 Moreover, it is not clear how
existing MEAs, which place restrictions on product or process methods (PPMs) and
which appear to discriminate between members and non-members would fair under
GATT's most-favored nation (MFN) requirements. 3 For example, the Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer3 , the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species 132 (CITES), and the Basel Convention
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and Their
Disposal 133 are three of the seventeen current MEAs that address environmental
problems, in part, through trade provisions which discriminate in favor of member
34
states. 1
To provide credibility to these agreements and to eliminate the uncertainty as to
whether these agreements are in compliance with GATT, measures should be taken
to clarify or to amend certain GATT provisions. One approach, proposed by the
European Community, would add an exemption under Article XX for agreements
that are generally multilateral, provided that each GATT member could accede
equally to such agreements, the agreements would not attempt to impose trade
restrictions outside their regions of interest, and the United Nations Environmental
Program (UNEP) could control the negotiating procedures establishing the

129

See, Pedrozo, UnreasonableExtension, supra note 14, at 95-96 (discussing the

IATTC). In 1950, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) accomplished
only modest conservation achievements in the ETP. Id. at 95. Eventually, the IATTC
established a voluntary monitoring and observation program in 1979 in which all of the ETP
harvesting nations with significant purse seine fleets agreed to participate in the collection
of data to determine MMPA compliance. Id. at 96. However laudable the efforts of the
participating members were, it did not provide a firm basis for accomplishing the ambitious
objectives of the MMPA. See Perkins, Does Might Make Right?, supra note 9, at 215

("Despite the success of the MMPA and IA'I'C programs in reducing the dolphin mortality
levels, dolphins were still being killed in the eastern Pacific tuna fishery.").
130

Schoenbaum, Search for Reconciliation,supra note 3, at 282 ("[The validity of

many MEA trade restrictions is at least doubtful .... ").
'' Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
reprintedin 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987).
132 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087.

133 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste
and their Disposal Mar. 22, 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989).
13 See STEINBERG, EU, NAFTA, AND WTO, supranote 101, at 238-40 (1997) (opining,
based on the reasoning used by the Tuna/Dolphin1I Panel,that the discriminatory measures
contained the described agreements "would likely be illegal under the WTO Agreements.").
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agreements. 135 However, this does not remedy the problem of uncertainty since
there is no bright-line definition for the term "multilateral." 136 Would a purely
137
regional agreement be considered a genuinely multilateral agreement?
A second approach would deal with MEAs on a case by case basis. This
approach finds support from Daniel C. Esty, author of the book Greening the GAiT,
and the Clinton administration. 13' Esty' s approach suggests applying a complicated
three-prong balancing test, weighing the concomitant impacts on trade and
environmental interests using factors of intent and effect, legitimacy, and
appropriateness. 139 However, this approach runs into the definitional problem of
identifying which policies are legitimate and which policies are appropriate.
Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs Timothy Wirth proposes placing MEAs
into categories, considering only those agreements that appropriately bind parties
to impose trade restrictions when "the effectiveness of an international

135 Blank, A Proposalfor the New WTO, supra note 123, at 101-4. Ironically, the
European Community made the proposal to the GATT Group on Environmental Measures
and International Trade in 1992 (just before requesting the dispute panel in Tuna/Dolphin
H). Id. (citing Directorate-General for External Relations, European Commission, The
GATT and the trade provisions of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (Nov. 13, 1992)
(unpublished submission to GATT by the EC).
136 Id. at 103 (questioning "how many countries must sign a treaty before it is considered
a multilateral agreement?").

137

See, e.g. North American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter NAFTA], infra note 144

(currently bearing the following members: United States, Canada and Mexico- with Chili's
membership imminent). Does the membership number in NAFTA constitute enough to
warrant a customary principle of international law, the environmental provisions of which
non-members should feel obligated to abide by? See United States International Trade
Commission, USITC Pub. 3043, May 1997/June 1997, availablein 1997 ITC LEXIS 216.
Or is NAFTA merely a regional treaty cloaked in a multilateral shell? Id. (providing data
supporting evidence of a prosperous (multilateral) trade relationship between the European
Union (E.U.) and NAFTA, as well as support for the theory that if the E.U. is willing to
enjoy the benefits of the economic strictures within NAFTA, it should also be willing to
endure reasonable environmental mandates contained therein).
138 Blank, A Proposalfor the New WTO, supra note 123, at 104-08 (detailing
DANIEL
C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE (1994), and
Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs Timothy Wirth's testimony before the Senate
Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism, Administration Unveils New Policy on
SanctionsforEnvironmentalHarm, 11 INT'LTRADE REP. (BNA) No. 6,221 (Feb. 9, 1994)).
139 Blank, A Proposalforthe New WTO, supranote 123, at 106 (describing the difficulty

in Esty's endorsement of the "legitimacy" of transboundary measures that threaten or affect
the global commons or the "sustainability of an important species or ecosystem.").
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environmental or conservation agreement is being diminished."' 4 MEAs that only
recommend trade sanctions would not fall within the permissible category.'
However, this approach begs the question of what factors to consider in determining
whether the required implementation of trade measures are appropriate. Thus, it
seems that approaching MEAs on a case by case basis raises more questions than
it answers.
Two more realistic approaches favoring MEAs, suggest either amending Article
XX to include a safe harbor provision for MEAs meeting uniform criteria 4 2 or
amending GATT to include the "least-inconsistent" test used in the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)1 43 Article 104 of NAFTA provides that when the
obligations of certain specified MEAs conflict with NAFTA obligations, the former
requirements should prevail, "provided that where a Party has a choice among
equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with such
obligations, the Party chooses the alternative least inconsistent with other provisions

14

Id. at 104 (quoting Administration Unveils New Policy on Sanctions for

EnvironmentalHarm, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, 221 (Feb. 9, 1994) [hereinafter
WIRTH REPORT]).
"' See WIRTH REPORT,

supra note 140, at 221 (illustrating the Clinton Administration's
unwillingness to impose trade sanctions for violations of MEAs when those agreements do
not require sanctions as such).
142 Schoenbaum, Search for Reconciliation, supra note 3, at 283-84 (arguing two
alternatives for dealing with MEAs, including the following: (1)one which would "add a
provision on MEAs ....(2)"[or one that would] adopt a collective interpretation of Article
XX" and "validate existing MEAs and provide for notification of future MEAs, as well as
set out criteria, a 'safe harbor,' they would have to fulfill to receive approval."). The latter
alternative is modeled after Professor Robert Hudec's approach, which would add a new
Article XX(k) and would specifically provide for a negotiating mechanism to bring domestic
environmental measures into the realm of a legitimately recognized MEA. Id. at 284 (citing
Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures Against Foreign
Environmental Practices, 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 95, 120-42 (Jagdish N.
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) [hereinafter Hudec, GATT Legal Restrants]).
14" Staffim, Trade Barrieror Trade Boon?, supra note 118, at 271 (discussing the
approach to environmental measures taken under NAFTA; see also ROBERT V. PERCIVAL
ET AL., ENViRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 1326 (2d ed. 1996)
(noting that former EPA administrator William Reilly described NAFTA as the 'greenest'
trade agreement ever negotiated) (internal quotations omitted); Steve Charnovitz, NAFTA:
An Analysis of Its EnvironmentalProvisions,23 ENvTL. L. REP. 10067 (1993) [hereinafter
Charnovitz, NAFTA Environmental Provisions] (providing an excellent analysis of the
environmental provisions contained in NAFTA).
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of [NAFTA]."' 4 This type of test clarifies the status of existing MEAs but calls
into question the status of future MEAs since their approval would be1conditioned
45
upon being added to the list of specified agreements within NAFTA.
The best way to remedy this potential discrepancy in GATT would be to add a
subsection (k) to Article XX. The new exemption must validate existing MEAs and
create a mechanism for future MEAs to fall within established criteria before
attaining approval. Professor Thomas Schoenbaum suggests reformulating the
European Community's approach to Article XX(h) by establishing three criteria that
would leave Article XX(k) outside the auspices of the UNEP. 146 Approval would
be issued for MEAs that "(1) are open to all parties that have a legitimate interest
in the environmental problem addressed; (2) adopt trade restrictions that are
reasonably related to the problem
addressed; and (3) comply with the jurisdictional
147
law.
international
of
norms
This approach would seem to create the same definitional problems as the
balancing test proposed by Daniel Esty. The difference, however is that
Schoenbaum' s approach places the criteria within the provisions of GATT, whereas
the Esty approach requires a crafty interpretation of one of the existing exemptions
under Article XX. In effect, Schoenbaum' s proposal would render "GATT-proof'
trade measures taken pursuant to a valid MEA against other GATT members even
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 104, reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 289, 297. See generally HAMILTON LoEB & MICHAEL OWEN, NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 109 (1993) [hereinafter LoEB & OWEN,
NAFTA] (analyzing environmental regulation under NAFTA). The "specific international
agreements" covered under Article 104 include CITES, the Montreal Protocol, the Basel
Convention, the US-Canada Bilateral Treaty on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Waste, and the US-Mexican Agreement on Improvement of the Environment in the Border
Area. Id. at nt. 19 (citing Article 104 and Annex 104.1 to NAFTA, which allow the member
states to add other agreements to the list in Annex 104.1).
145 Schoenbaum, Searchfor Reconciliation,supra note 3, at 283 (noting also that "an
ad hoc approach such as this may be workable for an organization of three states but would
not be for the 128-member WTO."). Cf.LOEB & OWEN, NAFFA, supra note 144, at 110
(noting that Article 904 of NAFTA allows each signatory to "adopt, maintain and apply"
standards "related to the safety and environment (as well as protection of consumers),
including measures which prohibit importation of goods from another signatory.") (internal
quotations omitted).
146 Schoenbaum, Searchfor Reconciliation, supranote 3, at 283 (concluding that a new
Article XX(k) would be preferable to amending an existing exception).
147 Id. at 284. This test is an adjustment of Professor Robert Hudec's proposal to use
Article XX(h), similar to the European Community's approach, as a model for MEA
approval. See Hudec, GAIT Legal Restraints,supra note 141, at 120-42.
144
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if that other member has refused to sign the MEA.'48 To ensure that the MEA
approval process is not abused, the WTO should be consulted and should apply the
criteria set forth in the preamble of Article XX which would protect against
"unjustified and arbitrary discrimination and disguised restrictions on international
trade.'

49

B. The GATT Secretariat's "Carrot"Rather Than "Stick" Approach
In response to the panel decision in Tuna/Dolphin I, the GATT Secretariat issued
a special report in 1992.50 The report admonished the use of any trade measures
to protect the environment, justifying the fears that many environmentalist
manifested subsequent to the Tuna/Dolphin I decision. Indeed, if the Secretariat's
report is to be taken literally, the fact that WTO countries can no longer block the
adoption of GATT panel decisions due to the automatic authorization of retaliatory
measures created under the 1994 Uruguay Round accord, will undoubtedly instigate
new disputes over environmentally motivated trade restrictions. 5 ' If the WTO
adopts the Secretariat's report, the efficacy of both MEAs and unilateral
conservation measures will face certain demise.
The Secretariat's approach insists on the use of subsidies as "carrots" rather than
the use of trade sanctions as "sticks.' ' 152 "Carrots" are positive trade incentives such
as offers to transfer environmental technology and financial assistance to those
countries that adopt conservation friendly policies.'53 The Secretariat endorses
148 See

Staffin, Trade Barrieror Trade Boon?, supra note 118, at 272 (approving the
amendment of Article XX to include a new exception).
14' But see Steinberg, EU, NAFTA, and WTO, supra note 101, at 243 (noting that
developing nations have "blocked" proposals to amend Article XX of GAT'T).
150 1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, International Trade 90-91 (1992). The
report issued by the GAT' Secretariat was a twenty-eight page insert to its 1992 Annual
Report. Blank, A Proposalforthe New WTO, supra note 123, at 99.
15' Howard F. Chang, Carrots,Sticks, and InternationalExternalities,17 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 309, 311 (1997) [hereinafter Chang, Carrots and Sticks] (noting that the 1994
Uruguay Round accords which established the WTO, now give GATT panel decisions some
teeth). See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, art. 16, para. 4, art. 17, para. 14, reprintedin 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1235, 1237
(1994).
152 Chang, Carrots and Sticks, supra note 151, at 312. Mr. Chang has
adopted this
useful paradigm to illustrate the stratagem of the GATT Secretariat. Dubbing trade
incentives as "carrots" and trade sanctions as "sticks", Chang proceeds to analyze and
indeed criticize the Secretariat's approach from a microeconomic point of view.
"' Id. (criticizing the use of subsidies to awaken developing countries to the costs of
environmental apathy).
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these measures as the sole mechanism for achieving transnational environmental
protection through trade. 54
' Under this regime, also known as the Coase theorem'55 ,
parties will bargain with one another to achieve a more efficient and harmonious
solution to environmental and trade concerns than they would through the
imposition of specific trade sanctions. However, the Coase theorem does not take
into account transaction costs and the free-rider problem.'56
Multilateral and bilateral agreements require extensive negotiations and
consequently take a lot of time to consummate if they are consummated at all.157
The result of these delays may inflict substantial costs not only on the negotiating
parties but on the environment as well. Another problem with the Secretariat's
approach is the potential for free-rider nations who will have incentives to
understate their interest in the environment to achieve greater trade incentives in
agreement negotiations.' 5 8 Countries may actually profit from harming the
environment because the negotiating state will offer more trade incentives to secure
the cooperation of those countries.159 Thus, the trade benefits will actually flow to
the countries harming the environment rather than to those who manifest interest in
protecting the global environment.
The failure of diplomatic negotiations, as already mentioned, is what sparked the
Tuna/Dolphin disputes in the first place. If the WTO were to espouse the
Secretariat's approach, the status of international trade and the global environment

'4 See Blank, A Proposalfor the New WTO, supra note 123, at 100 (discussing the
Secretariat's reasoning behind the "carrots" only approach, was that "unilateral restrictions
on trade would never be the most efficient instrument for dealing with an environmental
problem.").
155 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON., 1 (1960). Howard
Chang describes the Coase theorem as a principle which suggests that "as long as parties can
bargain with one another, they will reach an efficient solution regardless of the initial
allocation of legal rights." Chang, Carrotsand Sticks, supra note 151, at 312.
156 See Cooper, Real Global Warming, supranote 2, at 68-70 (describing the free-rider
problem that will inevitably plague the recently negotiated Kyoto Agreement in December,
1997). The free-rider problem results from the "wide distribution of expected but distant
benefits in response to collective action," which acts as a disincentive for countries to act
on global environmental issues. Id. at 69.
' Chang, Carrotsand Sticks, supra note 151, at 313.
15' Id. ([free-riders] "will have an incentive to understate [their] interest in protecting
the global environment (and to overstate [their] interest in exploiting it), to win a better deal
for [themselves] in the negotiations" because of the lack of information each country will
have about the preferences of the other nations).
159 Id. at 314-15 (suggesting that providing economic information to nations would be
most effective).
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will end up right where they started prior to the panel decisions.
C. The InternationalEnvironmentalManagement Standard,ISO 14000

In September of 1996, the International Standards Organization [hereinafter ISO]
approved ISO 14001 and 14004.160 These standards permit companies to
voluntarily develop environmental management systems (EMSs) to help combine
the economic objectives with the environmental objectives of organizations. 61 The
principle goal of these initiatives "is to support environmental protection and
prevention of pollution in balance with socio-economic needs.', 162 Despite the
standard's seemingly innocuous voluntary structure, dissention has emerged from
developing countries who see the ISO initiatives as a potential non-tariff barrier 1in
63
violation of GATT's 1994 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (ATBT).
The ATBT employs a NAFTA-like approach to non-tariff barriers, requiring that
international standards be no "more restrictive than necessary" to meet their
regulatory objectives." Environmental conservation is recognized as a legitimate
objective under the ATBT.165 Therefore, the ISO standards seem impervious to a
challenge under GATT since they are not mandatory and further a legitimate
objective. However, developing countries are concerned that more industrialized
countries will use ISO certification as a means of excluding entry into their

160 ISO 14001, 14004: Environmental Management Systems, International Standards
Organization (ISO), ISO 14001:1996(E), 14004:1996(E) (Sept. 1, 1996) [hereinafter, ISO
14001, 14004].

161 Paula C. Murray, The InternationalEnvironmentManagementStandard,ISO 14000:
A Non-TariffBarrierora Step to an Emerging Global EnvironmentalPolicy?, 18 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 577, 578 (1997) [hereinafter Murray, ISO 14000].

See ISO 14001, supra note 160, at art. v. (providing also that the standards are not
intended to create non-tariff trade barriers "or to increase or change an organization's legal
obligations.").
163 Murray, ISO 14000, supra note 161, at 580; see also Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 1428 (2d Sess. 1994)
[hereinafter ATBT] (establishing the impetus for concern from developing nations).
162

'"

ATBT, supra note 163, at art. 2.2. Compare with NAFTA, supra note 144 and

accompanying text.
165 ATBT, supra note 163, at art. 2.2. This is perhaps why ISO 14000 is so attractive
to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, who is considering requiring compliance as
a prerequisite for some programs. Murray, ISO 14000, supra note 161, at 580, nt. 19.
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markets.' 66 If countries are in fact excluded from the global market, the ISO
standards will not be furthering their environmental objectives, which will create
problems under the ATBT.'67
It appears that even setting voluntary standards to achieve progress in
environmental conservation raises trade barrier issues. Under the current
international system, a nation cannot attempt to accomplish indirectly what it is
prohibited from doing directly if it affects trade. This conclusion is inevitable
because trade and the environment are inexorably linked to each other. 168 A state
cannot trade without affecting the environment. A state cannot protect the
environment without affecting trade. The only solution is to address the conflict
between the environment
and trade directly by expressly providing allowances for
16 9
MEAs in GATT.

166

Id. at 579; see also Herman E. Daly, FromAdjustment to SustainableDevelopment:

The Obstacle ofFree Trade, 15 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 33, 36- 39 (1992) (hereinafter
Daly, Obstacle of Free Trade) (discussing why free trade might also make it difficult for
developing nations to internalize costs, creating the fear that environmental mandates will
stagnate economic development).
167 Murray, ISO 1400, supra note 161, at 606-7 (noting that the ATBT allows countries
to deviate from international standards only when the international standards would detract
from the achievement of the regulatory goal). However, the "burden of proof is on the
member to justify such a deviation." Id. Since the voluntary standards of the ISO may
prevent some developing companies from entering global markets, it will be difficult to show
how these standards are furthering the objective of encouraging effective environmental
management policies. Id.
168

See, e.g., Kennedy, A MultilateralApproach, supra note 90, at 228-33 (discussing

the legitimacy resulting from environmental measures incorporated in MEAs); Shultz,
GATT/WTO Committee, supra note 3, at 423 (analyzing the results of the 1993 Uruguay
Round of GATT and the formation of a new Committee on Trade and Environment, which
evidences a strong multilateral trend toward commingling free-trade and environmental
conservation principles).
169

See, e.g. Michael Porter, America's Green Strategy, 264 Sci. AM. 168 (Apr. 1991)

(arguing from an economist's perspective that stringent domestic environmental policies
actually promote trade, including the quality of products and ultimately international
competition); See also Daly, Obstacle of Free Trade, supra note 166, at 36 (arguing that

there is a conflict between domestic environmental measures and free trade because if one
country imposes environmental measures, increasing costs, and the other country with whom
it conducts trade does not adopt such measures, "the second country will have lower prices
and will drive the competing firms in the first country out of business"). But see Charnovitz,
Green Roots, supra note 77, at 348-51 (commenting that "GATI' should respect national
environmental sovereignty" but not to the point where it is unable to control commercial
protectionism "disguised as environmental" conservation). The emphasis should be a
balance between both trade and the environment. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION

The new World Trade Organization must allow GATT to be more receptive to
MEAs. This is the only mechanism that will offer any meaningful incentive for
countries to view the environment from a global perspective. By linking trade with
the environment, multilateral conservation efforts will not be construed as trade
barriers but as necessary prerequisites to participation in global markets. Those
countries who refuse to adopt this view will be left behind. GATT does allow for
relaxation of its Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment for regional organizations
that include reasonable environmental provisions. There is no logical basis for
prohibiting MEAs that include reasonable trade provisions. The Tuna/Dolphin
cases represented the inevitable clash between two laudable goals- environmental
protection and free-trade. Resolution of this conflict and future conflicts can only
come from the incorporation of both of these objectives into one global regime.
Joseph J. Urgese
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